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Abstract
The paper investigates the Lattice Agreement (LA) problem in asynchronous systems. In LA
each process proposes an element e from a predetermined lattice, and has to decide on an element
e′ of the lattice such that e ≤ e′. Moreover, decisions of different processes have to be comparable
(no two processes can decide two elements e and e′ such that (e 6≤ e′) ∧ (e′ 6≤ e)).
It has been shown that Generalized LA (i.e., a version of LA proposing and deciding on sequences
of values) can be used to build a Replicated State Machine (RSM) with commutative update oper-
ations. The key advantage of LA and Generalized LA is that they can be solved in asynchronous
systems prone to crash-failures (this is not the case with standard Consensus).
In this paper we assume Byzantine failures. We propose the Wait Till Safe (WTS) algorithm
for LA, and we show that its resilience to f ≤ (n− 1)/3 Byzantines is optimal. We then generalize
WTS obtaining a Generalized LA algorithm, namely GWTS. We use GWTS to build a RSM with
commutative updates. Our RSM works in asynchronous systems and tolerates f ≤ (n−1)/3 malicious
entities. All our algorithms use the minimal assumption of authenticated channels. When the more
powerful public signatures are available, we discuss how to improve the message complexity of our
results (from quadratic to linear, when f = O(1)). At the best of our knowledge this is the first
paper proposing a solution for Byzantine LA that works on any possible lattice, and it is the first
work proposing a Byzantine tolerant RSM built on it.
1 Introduction
State machine replication (RSM) is today the foundation of many cloud-based highly-available products:
it allows some service to be deployed such to guarantee its correct functioning despite possible faults.
In RSM, clients issue operation requests to a set of distributed processes implementing the replicated
service, that, in turn, run a protocol to decide the order of execution of incoming operations and provide
clients with outputs. Faults can be accidental (e.g. a computer crashing due to a loss of power) or have
a malicious intent (e.g. a compromised server). Whichever is the chosen fault model, RSM has proven
to be a reliable and effective solution for the deployment of dependable services. RSM is usually built
on top of a distributed Consensus primitive that is used by processes to agree on the order of execution
of requests concurrently issued by clients. The main problem with this approach is that Consensus is
impossible to achieve deterministically in a distributed settings if the system is asynchronous and even
just a single process may fail by crashing [1]. This led the research community to study and develop
alternative solutions based on the relaxation of some of the constraints, to allow agreement to be reached
in partially synchronous systems with faulty processes by trading off consistency with availability.
An alternative approach consists in imposing constraints on the set of operations that can be issued
by clients, i.e. imposing updates that commute. In particular, in 2012 Faleiro et al. [2] introduced a
RSM approach based on a generalized version of the well known Lattice Agreement (LA) problem, that
restricts the set of allowed update operations to commuting ones [3]. They have shown that commuting
replicated data types (CRDTs) can be implemented with an RSM approach in asynchronous settings
using the monotonic growth of a join semilattice, i.e., a partially ordered set that defines a join (least
upper bound) for all element pairs (see Figure 1 for an example). A typical example is the implementation
of a dependable counter with add and read operations, where updates (i.e. adds) are commutative.
In the Lattice Agreement problem, introduced by Attiya et al. [4], each process pi has an input value
xi drawn from the join semilattice and must decide an output value yi, such that (i) yi is the join of xi
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and some set of input values and (ii) all output values are comparable to each other in the lattice, that is
form a chain in the lattice (see Figure 1). Lattice Agreement describes situations in which processes need
to obtain some knowledge on the global execution of the system, for example a global photography of the
system. In particular Attiya et al. [4] have shown that in the asynchronous shared memory computational
model, implementing a snapshot object is equivalent to solving the Lattice Agreement problem.
Differently from Consensus, Lattice Agreement can be deterministically solved in an asynchronous
setting in presence of crash failures. Faleiro et al. [2] have shown that a majority of correct processes and
reliable communication channels are sufficient to solve Lattice Agreement, while Garg et al. [5] proposed
a solution that requires O(log n) message delays, where n is the number of processes participating to the
algorithm. The very recent solution of Skrzypczak et al. [6] considerably improves Faleiro’s construction
in terms of memory consumption, at the expense of progress.
In the Generalized Lattice Agreement (GLA) problem processes propose an infinite number of input
values (drawn from an infinite semilattice) and decide an infinite sequence of output values, such that,
all output values are comparable to each other in the lattice i.e. form a chain (as for Lattice Agreement);
the sequence of decision values are non-decreasing, and every input values eventually appears in some
decision values. Solving GLA in asynchronous distributed systems reveals to be very powerful as it allows
to built a linearizable RSM of commutative update operations [2].
Despite recent advancements in this field, to the best of our knowledge no general solution exists
that solves Lattice Agreement problems in an asynchronous setting with Byzantine faults. In the present
paper we continue the line of research on Lattice Agreement in asynchronous message-passing systems
by considering a Byzantine fault model, that is a model where processes may exhibit arbitrary behaviors.
We first introduce the LA specifications that takes into account Byzantine faults. Then we propose an
algorithm, namely Wait Till Safe (WTS), which, in presence of less than (n− 1)/3 Byzantine processes,
guarantees that any correct process decides in no more than 5+2f message delays with a global message
complexity in O(n2) per process. We show that (n−1)/3 is an upper bound. Our algorithm makes use of
a Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive to circumvent adversarial runs where a Byzantine process may
induce correct processes to deliver different input values. The algorithm is wait-free, i.e., every process
completes its execution of the algorithm within a bounded number of steps, regardless of the execution
of other processes. Note that Nowak and Rybicki [7] recently proposed a solution for a more constrained
specification of LA in a Byzantine setting where correct processes are not allowed to decide values that
contain inputs from Byzantine processes; Similarly to previous contributions in the area of Byzantine
fault-tolerant agreement [8], our specification allows that input values proposed by Byzantine processes
may be included in some decisions from some correct processes; this choice allows us to sidestep the
impossibility results of [8] and makes our solution suitable in important application use cases where the
set of input values is infinite (e.g. natural numbers).
We then go a step further by proposing an algorithm, namely Generalized Wait Till Safe (GWTS),
to solve GLA in a Byzantine fault model. Here the challenge is twofold: first, we need to guarantee
that, despite the fact that input values are proposed in tumbling batches, Byzantine processes cannot
keep rejecting all new proposals under the pretext that they are not comparable with the current ones.
Second, we must ensure that adversarial processes cannot progress much faster than all the other correct
processes (i.e., output decision values faster than correct processes) which would allow them to prevent
all correct processing from proposing their own values. Our “wait until safe” strategy guarantees that
each correct process performs an infinite sequence of decisions, and for each input received at a correct
process, its value is eventually included in a decision. Our algorithm is wait-free and is resilient to
f ≤ (n− 1)/3 Byzantine processes.
We present the construction of a RSM for objects with commuting update operations that guarantees
both linearizability and progress in asynchronous environments with Byzantine failures.
Finally, we sketch the main lines of a signature-based version of our algorithms which takes advantage
of digital signatures to reduce the message complexity to O(n) per process, when f = O(1).
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper proposing a solution for Byzantine LA that works
on any possible lattice, and it is the first work proposing a Byzantine tolerant RSM built on it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discussed the related works; Section 4
illustrates the necessity of at least (3f + 1) processes, while Section 3 describes the system model;
Section 5 and Section 6 introduce the algorithms for Byzantine LA and Byzantine GLA, respectively;
Section 7 describe the construction of a byzantine tolerant RSM; Section 8 sketches a signature-based
variant of our solutions and, finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
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{3, 4}
<latexit sha1_base64="DjnMLU4XyZVEA08coJbiOW3XOFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahk0mYuVFKyEe41Q/wa9yJ4MpfMYlZ2NazOpxzL+dwvFA Kg7b9ZZXW1jc2t8rblZ3dvf2Dau2wa4JIc+jwQAa67zEDUijooEAJ/VAD8z0JPW92k/m9R9BGBOoe5yEMfTZVYiI4w1TqufHledN NRtW63bBz0FXiFKROCrRHNavsjgMe+aCQS2bMwLFDHMZMo+ASkoobGQgZn7EpDFKqmA9mGOd9E3oaGYYBDUFTIWkuwt+PmPnGzH0 vvfQZPphlLxP/8wYRTq6HsVBhhKB4FoRCQh5kuBbpEEDHQgMiy5oDFYpyphkiaEEZ56kYpcssBPqRRKGDp2RRTcM9L5DZds7yUqu ke9Fw7IZz16y3msWKZXJMTsgZccgVaZFb0iYdwsmMPJMX8mq9We/Wh/X5e1qyip8jsgDr+wdM1KUz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DjnMLU4XyZVEA08coJbiOW3XOFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahk0mYuVFKyEe41Q/wa9yJ4MpfMYlZ2NazOpxzL+dwvFA Kg7b9ZZXW1jc2t8rblZ3dvf2Dau2wa4JIc+jwQAa67zEDUijooEAJ/VAD8z0JPW92k/m9R9BGBOoe5yEMfTZVYiI4w1TqufHledN NRtW63bBz0FXiFKROCrRHNavsjgMe+aCQS2bMwLFDHMZMo+ASkoobGQgZn7EpDFKqmA9mGOd9E3oaGYYBDUFTIWkuwt+PmPnGzH0 vvfQZPphlLxP/8wYRTq6HsVBhhKB4FoRCQh5kuBbpEEDHQgMiy5oDFYpyphkiaEEZ56kYpcssBPqRRKGDp2RRTcM9L5DZds7yUqu ke9Fw7IZz16y3msWKZXJMTsgZccgVaZFb0iYdwsmMPJMX8mq9We/Wh/X5e1qyip8jsgDr+wdM1KUz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DjnMLU4XyZVEA08coJbiOW3XOFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahk0mYuVFKyEe41Q/wa9yJ4MpfMYlZ2NazOpxzL+dwvFA Kg7b9ZZXW1jc2t8rblZ3dvf2Dau2wa4JIc+jwQAa67zEDUijooEAJ/VAD8z0JPW92k/m9R9BGBOoe5yEMfTZVYiI4w1TqufHledN NRtW63bBz0FXiFKROCrRHNavsjgMe+aCQS2bMwLFDHMZMo+ASkoobGQgZn7EpDFKqmA9mGOd9E3oaGYYBDUFTIWkuwt+PmPnGzH0 vvfQZPphlLxP/8wYRTq6HsVBhhKB4FoRCQh5kuBbpEEDHQgMiy5oDFYpyphkiaEEZ56kYpcssBPqRRKGDp2RRTcM9L5DZds7yUqu ke9Fw7IZz16y3msWKZXJMTsgZccgVaZFb0iYdwsmMPJMX8mq9We/Wh/X5e1qyip8jsgDr+wdM1KUz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="DjnMLU4XyZVEA08coJbiOW3XOFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahk0mYuVFKyEe41Q/wa9yJ4MpfMYlZ2NazOpxzL+dwvFA Kg7b9ZZXW1jc2t8rblZ3dvf2Dau2wa4JIc+jwQAa67zEDUijooEAJ/VAD8z0JPW92k/m9R9BGBOoe5yEMfTZVYiI4w1TqufHledN NRtW63bBz0FXiFKROCrRHNavsjgMe+aCQS2bMwLFDHMZMo+ASkoobGQgZn7EpDFKqmA9mGOd9E3oaGYYBDUFTIWkuwt+PmPnGzH0 vvfQZPphlLxP/8wYRTq6HsVBhhKB4FoRCQh5kuBbpEEDHQgMiy5oDFYpyphkiaEEZ56kYpcssBPqRRKGDp2RRTcM9L5DZds7yUqu ke9Fw7IZz16y3msWKZXJMTsgZccgVaZFb0iYdwsmMPJMX8mq9We/Wh/X5e1qyip8jsgDr+wdM1KUz</latexit>
{1, 2}
<latexit sha1_base64="rHGG ev1zcJXAc+FbITZE9nHdlf4=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne 5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiyFRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFR tXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+Iygtov Ae5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu4lz2XQXo2rdbtg56DpxClInBTqjmlV2 xxE3AYTIJdN66NgxeglTKLiERcU1GmLGZ2wKw5SGLADtJXnfBT 03mmFEY1BUSJqL8PcjYYHW88BPLwOGD3rVy8T/vKHBybWXiDA2 CCHPglBIyIM0VyIdAuhYKEBkWXOgIqScKYYISlDGeSqadJmlwM BIFCp6WiyrabjvRzLbzlldap30mg3Hbjh3rXq7VaxYJqfkjFwQ h1yRNrklHdIlnMzIM3khr9ab9W59WJ+/pyWr+DkhS7C+fwBF3K Uv</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rHGG ev1zcJXAc+FbITZE9nHdlf4=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne 5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiyFRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFR tXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+Iygtov Ae5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu4lz2XQXo2rdbtg56DpxClInBTqjmlV2 xxE3AYTIJdN66NgxeglTKLiERcU1GmLGZ2wKw5SGLADtJXnfBT 03mmFEY1BUSJqL8PcjYYHW88BPLwOGD3rVy8T/vKHBybWXiDA2 CCHPglBIyIM0VyIdAuhYKEBkWXOgIqScKYYISlDGeSqadJmlwM BIFCp6WiyrabjvRzLbzlldap30mg3Hbjh3rXq7VaxYJqfkjFwQ h1yRNrklHdIlnMzIM3khr9ab9W59WJ+/pyWr+DkhS7C+fwBF3K Uv</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rHGG ev1zcJXAc+FbITZE9nHdlf4=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne 5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiyFRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFR tXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+Iygtov Ae5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu4lz2XQXo2rdbtg56DpxClInBTqjmlV2 xxE3AYTIJdN66NgxeglTKLiERcU1GmLGZ2wKw5SGLADtJXnfBT 03mmFEY1BUSJqL8PcjYYHW88BPLwOGD3rVy8T/vKHBybWXiDA2 CCHPglBIyIM0VyIdAuhYKEBkWXOgIqScKYYISlDGeSqadJmlwM BIFCp6WiyrabjvRzLbzlldap30mg3Hbjh3rXq7VaxYJqfkjFwQ h1yRNrklHdIlnMzIM3khr9ab9W59WJ+/pyWr+DkhS7C+fwBF3K Uv</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="rHGG ev1zcJXAc+FbITZE9nHdlf4=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne 5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiyFRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFR tXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+Iygtov Ae5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu4lz2XQXo2rdbtg56DpxClInBTqjmlV2 xxE3AYTIJdN66NgxeglTKLiERcU1GmLGZ2wKw5SGLADtJXnfBT 03mmFEY1BUSJqL8PcjYYHW88BPLwOGD3rVy8T/vKHBybWXiDA2 CCHPglBIyIM0VyIdAuhYKEBkWXOgIqScKYYISlDGeSqadJmlwM BIFCp6WiyrabjvRzLbzlldap30mg3Hbjh3rXq7VaxYJqfkjFwQ h1yRNrklHdIlnMzIM3khr9ab9W59WJ+/pyWr+DkhS7C+fwBF3K Uv</latexit>
{1, 3}
<latexit sha1_base64="RhwG K14FynUSgcS+0kADb+P99Cg=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahkwczd5QS8hFu9QP8Gn ciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcL5JCo21/WaW19Y3NrfJ2ZWd3b/+g Wjvs6tAoDh0eylD1PaZBigA6KFBCP1LAfE9Cz5vdZH7vEZQWYX CP8wiGPpsGYiI4w1TqubFzfukmo2rdbtg56CpxClInBdqjmlV2 xyE3PgTIJdN64NgRDmOmUHAJScU1GiLGZ2wKg5QGzAc9jPO+CT 01mmFII1BUSJqL8PcjZr7Wc99LL32GD3rZy8T/vIHByfUwFkFk EAKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUA5UwwRlKCM81Q06TILgb 6RKFT4lCyqabjnhTLbzlleapV0LxqO3XDumvVWs1ixTI7JCTkj DrkiLXJL2qRDOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNEFmB9/wBHma Uw</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RhwG K14FynUSgcS+0kADb+P99Cg=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahkwczd5QS8hFu9QP8Gn ciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcL5JCo21/WaW19Y3NrfJ2ZWd3b/+g Wjvs6tAoDh0eylD1PaZBigA6KFBCP1LAfE9Cz5vdZH7vEZQWYX CP8wiGPpsGYiI4w1TqubFzfukmo2rdbtg56CpxClInBdqjmlV2 xyE3PgTIJdN64NgRDmOmUHAJScU1GiLGZ2wKg5QGzAc9jPO+CT 01mmFII1BUSJqL8PcjZr7Wc99LL32GD3rZy8T/vIHByfUwFkFk EAKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUA5UwwRlKCM81Q06TILgb 6RKFT4lCyqabjnhTLbzlleapV0LxqO3XDumvVWs1ixTI7JCTkj DrkiLXJL2qRDOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNEFmB9/wBHma Uw</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RhwG K14FynUSgcS+0kADb+P99Cg=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahkwczd5QS8hFu9QP8Gn ciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcL5JCo21/WaW19Y3NrfJ2ZWd3b/+g Wjvs6tAoDh0eylD1PaZBigA6KFBCP1LAfE9Cz5vdZH7vEZQWYX CP8wiGPpsGYiI4w1TqubFzfukmo2rdbtg56CpxClInBdqjmlV2 xyE3PgTIJdN64NgRDmOmUHAJScU1GiLGZ2wKg5QGzAc9jPO+CT 01mmFII1BUSJqL8PcjZr7Wc99LL32GD3rZy8T/vIHByfUwFkFk EAKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUA5UwwRlKCM81Q06TILgb 6RKFT4lCyqabjnhTLbzlleapV0LxqO3XDumvVWs1ixTI7JCTkj DrkiLXJL2qRDOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNEFmB9/wBHma Uw</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RhwG K14FynUSgcS+0kADb+P99Cg=">AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62v VpduBovgQkqiBV0W3LisYB/QlDKZ3tahkwczd5QS8hFu9QP8Gn ciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcL5JCo21/WaW19Y3NrfJ2ZWd3b/+g Wjvs6tAoDh0eylD1PaZBigA6KFBCP1LAfE9Cz5vdZH7vEZQWYX CP8wiGPpsGYiI4w1TqubFzfukmo2rdbtg56CpxClInBdqjmlV2 xyE3PgTIJdN64NgRDmOmUHAJScU1GiLGZ2wKg5QGzAc9jPO+CT 01mmFII1BUSJqL8PcjZr7Wc99LL32GD3rZy8T/vIHByfUwFkFk EAKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUA5UwwRlKCM81Q06TILgb 6RKFT4lCyqabjnhTLbzlleapV0LxqO3XDumvVWs1ixTI7JCTkj DrkiLXJL2qRDOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNEFmB9/wBHma Uw</latexit>
{2, 3}
<latexit sha1_base64="3E1nlP8yy3GIhd7hNo2DS350vFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPXV6tLNYBFcSElqQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3XoZBJmbpQS+hFu9QP8GnciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcP5L CoG1/WWvrG5tb26Wd8u7e/sFhpXrUNWGsOXR4KEPd95kBKRR0UKCEfqSBBb6Enj+9yfzeI2gjQnWPswi8gE2UGAvOMJV6btK4uHT nw0rNrts56CpxClIjBdrDqlVyRyGPA1DIJTNm4NgRegnTKLiEedmNDUSMT9kEBilVLADjJXnfOT2LDcOQRqCpkDQX4e9HwgJjZoG fXgYMH8yyl4n/eYMYx9deIlQUIyieBaGQkAcZrkU6BNCR0IDIsuZAhaKcaYYIWlDGeSrG6TILgUEsUejwab6opuG+H8psO2d5qVX SbdQdu+7cNWutZrFiiZyQU3JOHHJFWuSWtEmHcDIlz+SFvFpv1rv1YX3+nq5Zxc8xWYD1/QNJWKUx</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3E1nlP8yy3GIhd7hNo2DS350vFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPXV6tLNYBFcSElqQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3XoZBJmbpQS+hFu9QP8GnciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcP5L CoG1/WWvrG5tb26Wd8u7e/sFhpXrUNWGsOXR4KEPd95kBKRR0UKCEfqSBBb6Enj+9yfzeI2gjQnWPswi8gE2UGAvOMJV6btK4uHT nw0rNrts56CpxClIjBdrDqlVyRyGPA1DIJTNm4NgRegnTKLiEedmNDUSMT9kEBilVLADjJXnfOT2LDcOQRqCpkDQX4e9HwgJjZoG fXgYMH8yyl4n/eYMYx9deIlQUIyieBaGQkAcZrkU6BNCR0IDIsuZAhaKcaYYIWlDGeSrG6TILgUEsUejwab6opuG+H8psO2d5qVX SbdQdu+7cNWutZrFiiZyQU3JOHHJFWuSWtEmHcDIlz+SFvFpv1rv1YX3+nq5Zxc8xWYD1/QNJWKUx</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3E1nlP8yy3GIhd7hNo2DS350vFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPXV6tLNYBFcSElqQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3XoZBJmbpQS+hFu9QP8GnciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcP5L CoG1/WWvrG5tb26Wd8u7e/sFhpXrUNWGsOXR4KEPd95kBKRR0UKCEfqSBBb6Enj+9yfzeI2gjQnWPswi8gE2UGAvOMJV6btK4uHT nw0rNrts56CpxClIjBdrDqlVyRyGPA1DIJTNm4NgRegnTKLiEedmNDUSMT9kEBilVLADjJXnfOT2LDcOQRqCpkDQX4e9HwgJjZoG fXgYMH8yyl4n/eYMYx9deIlQUIyieBaGQkAcZrkU6BNCR0IDIsuZAhaKcaYYIWlDGeSrG6TILgUEsUejwab6opuG+H8psO2d5qVX SbdQdu+7cNWutZrFiiZyQU3JOHHJFWuSWtEmHcDIlz+SFvFpv1rv1YX3+nq5Zxc8xWYD1/QNJWKUx</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3E1nlP8yy3GIhd7hNo2DS350vFk=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPXV6tLNYBFcSElqQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3XoZBJmbpQS+hFu9QP8GnciuPJXTGIWtvWsDufcyzkcP5L CoG1/WWvrG5tb26Wd8u7e/sFhpXrUNWGsOXR4KEPd95kBKRR0UKCEfqSBBb6Enj+9yfzeI2gjQnWPswi8gE2UGAvOMJV6btK4uHT nw0rNrts56CpxClIjBdrDqlVyRyGPA1DIJTNm4NgRegnTKLiEedmNDUSMT9kEBilVLADjJXnfOT2LDcOQRqCpkDQX4e9HwgJjZoG fXgYMH8yyl4n/eYMYx9deIlQUIyieBaGQkAcZrkU6BNCR0IDIsuZAhaKcaYYIWlDGeSrG6TILgUEsUejwab6opuG+H8psO2d5qVX SbdQdu+7cNWutZrFiiZyQU3JOHHJFWuSWtEmHcDIlz+SFvFpv1rv1YX3+nq5Zxc8xWYD1/QNJWKUx</latexit>
{2, 4}
<latexit sha1_base64="cXoYTA/Vgfna1AX3VlgysPCAV7c=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiy FRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFRtXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+IygtovAe5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu0nzsuU uRtW63bBz0HXiFKROCnRGNavsjiNuAgiRS6b10LFj9BKmUHAJi4prNMSMz9gUhikNWQDaS/K+C3puNMOIxqCokDQX4e9HwgKt54G fXgYMH/Sql4n/eUODk2svEWFsEEKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUg5UwwRlKCM81Q06TJLgYGRKFT0tFhW03Dfj2S2nbO61Dr pNRuO3XDuWvV2q1ixTE7JGbkgDrkibXJLOqRLOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNClmB9/wBLFaUy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cXoYTA/Vgfna1AX3VlgysPCAV7c=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiy FRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFRtXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+IygtovAe5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu0nzsuU uRtW63bBz0HXiFKROCnRGNavsjiNuAgiRS6b10LFj9BKmUHAJi4prNMSMz9gUhikNWQDaS/K+C3puNMOIxqCokDQX4e9HwgKt54G fXgYMH/Sql4n/eUODk2svEWFsEEKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUg5UwwRlKCM81Q06TJLgYGRKFT0tFhW03Dfj2S2nbO61Dr pNRuO3XDuWvV2q1ixTE7JGbkgDrkibXJLOqRLOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNClmB9/wBLFaUy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cXoYTA/Vgfna1AX3VlgysPCAV7c=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiy FRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFRtXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+IygtovAe5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu0nzsuU uRtW63bBz0HXiFKROCnRGNavsjiNuAgiRS6b10LFj9BKmUHAJi4prNMSMz9gUhikNWQDaS/K+C3puNMOIxqCokDQX4e9HwgKt54G fXgYMH/Sql4n/eUODk2svEWFsEEKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUg5UwwRlKCM81Q06TJLgYGRKFT0tFhW03Dfj2S2nbO61Dr pNRuO3XDuWvV2q1ixTE7JGbkgDrkibXJLOqRLOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNClmB9/wBLFaUy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="cXoYTA/Vgfna1AX3VlgysPCAV7c=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVpduBovgQkpSCrosuHFZwT6gCWUyva1DJw9m7igl9CPc6gf4Ne5EcOWvmMQsbOtZHc65l3M4fiy FRtv+skobm1vbO+Xdyt7+weFRtXbc05FRHLo8kpEa+EyDFCF0UaCEQayABb6Evj+7yfz+IygtovAe5zF4AZuGYiI4w1Tqu0nzsuU uRtW63bBz0HXiFKROCnRGNavsjiNuAgiRS6b10LFj9BKmUHAJi4prNMSMz9gUhikNWQDaS/K+C3puNMOIxqCokDQX4e9HwgKt54G fXgYMH/Sql4n/eUODk2svEWFsEEKeBaGQkAdprkQ6BNCxUIDIsuZARUg5UwwRlKCM81Q06TJLgYGRKFT0tFhW03Dfj2S2nbO61Dr pNRuO3XDuWvV2q1ixTE7JGbkgDrkibXJLOqRLOJmRZ/JCXq036936sD5/T0tW8XNClmB9/wBLFaUy</latexit>
{1, 4}
<latexit sha1_base64="MTTYAbC71tpKBNaJBTFYXAYUCfs=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3xWeur1aWbwSK4kJJIQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3Xo5MHMjVJCPsKtfoBf404EV/6KSczCtp7V4Zx7OYfjRUo atKwvura+sbm1Xdmp7u7tHxzW6kc9E8ZaQFeEKtQDjxtQMoAuSlQwiDRw31PQ92Y3ud9/BG1kGNzjPALX59NATqTgmEl9J7EvWk4 6qjWsplWArRK7JA1SojOq04ozDkXsQ4BCcWOGthWhm3CNUihIq05sIOJixqcwzGjAfTBuUvRN2VlsOIYsAs2kYoUIfz8S7hsz973 s0uf4YJa9XPzPG8Y4uXYTGUQxQiDyIJQKiiAjtMyGADaWGhB53hyYDJjgmiOClowLkYlxtsxCoB8rlDp8ShfVLNzzQpVvZy8vtUp 6l03batp3rUa7Va5YISfklJwTm1yRNrklHdIlgszIM3khr/SNvtMP+vl7ukbLn2OyAPr9A0lWpTE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="MTTYAbC71tpKBNaJBTFYXAYUCfs=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3xWeur1aWbwSK4kJJIQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3Xo5MHMjVJCPsKtfoBf404EV/6KSczCtp7V4Zx7OYfjRUo atKwvura+sbm1Xdmp7u7tHxzW6kc9E8ZaQFeEKtQDjxtQMoAuSlQwiDRw31PQ92Y3ud9/BG1kGNzjPALX59NATqTgmEl9J7EvWk4 6qjWsplWArRK7JA1SojOq04ozDkXsQ4BCcWOGthWhm3CNUihIq05sIOJixqcwzGjAfTBuUvRN2VlsOIYsAs2kYoUIfz8S7hsz973 s0uf4YJa9XPzPG8Y4uXYTGUQxQiDyIJQKiiAjtMyGADaWGhB53hyYDJjgmiOClowLkYlxtsxCoB8rlDp8ShfVLNzzQpVvZy8vtUp 6l03batp3rUa7Va5YISfklJwTm1yRNrklHdIlgszIM3khr/SNvtMP+vl7ukbLn2OyAPr9A0lWpTE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="MTTYAbC71tpKBNaJBTFYXAYUCfs=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3xWeur1aWbwSK4kJJIQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3Xo5MHMjVJCPsKtfoBf404EV/6KSczCtp7V4Zx7OYfjRUo atKwvura+sbm1Xdmp7u7tHxzW6kc9E8ZaQFeEKtQDjxtQMoAuSlQwiDRw31PQ92Y3ud9/BG1kGNzjPALX59NATqTgmEl9J7EvWk4 6qjWsplWArRK7JA1SojOq04ozDkXsQ4BCcWOGthWhm3CNUihIq05sIOJixqcwzGjAfTBuUvRN2VlsOIYsAs2kYoUIfz8S7hsz973 s0uf4YJa9XPzPG8Y4uXYTGUQxQiDyIJQKiiAjtMyGADaWGhB53hyYDJjgmiOClowLkYlxtsxCoB8rlDp8ShfVLNzzQpVvZy8vtUp 6l03batp3rUa7Va5YISfklJwTm1yRNrklHdIlgszIM3khr/SNvtMP+vl7ukbLn2OyAPr9A0lWpTE=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="MTTYAbC71tpKBNaJBTFYXAYUCfs=" >AAACJXicbVDLSsNAFJ3xWeur1aWbwSK4kJJIQZcFNy4r2Ac0oUymt3Xo5MHMjVJCPsKtfoBf404EV/6KSczCtp7V4Zx7OYfjRUo atKwvura+sbm1Xdmp7u7tHxzW6kc9E8ZaQFeEKtQDjxtQMoAuSlQwiDRw31PQ92Y3ud9/BG1kGNzjPALX59NATqTgmEl9J7EvWk4 6qjWsplWArRK7JA1SojOq04ozDkXsQ4BCcWOGthWhm3CNUihIq05sIOJixqcwzGjAfTBuUvRN2VlsOIYsAs2kYoUIfz8S7hsz973 s0uf4YJa9XPzPG8Y4uXYTGUQxQiDyIJQKiiAjtMyGADaWGhB53hyYDJjgmiOClowLkYlxtsxCoB8rlDp8ShfVLNzzQpVvZy8vtUp 6l03batp3rUa7Va5YISfklJwTm1yRNrklHdIlgszIM3khr/SNvtMP+vl7ukbLn2OyAPr9A0lWpTE=</latexit>
{1, 2, 3}
<latexit sha1_base64="oqFt wiIdYkbWwUAtcxHKpMZ2Oyg=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyB Lt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8Gn dGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVIYtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgs lY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N /hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3buxU69ULdz4sVeyanYGuEicnFZKjNSxb BXcU8EiBj1wyY/qOHeIgZhoFlzAvupGBkPEpm0A/oT5TYAZx1n hOzyLDMKAhaCokzUT4+xEzZcxMecmlYvhglr1U/M/rRzi+GsTC DyMEn6dBKCRkQYZrkUwBdCQ0ILK0OVDhU840QwQtKOM8EaNkm4 VAFUkUOniaL6pJuOcFMt3OWV5qlXTqNceuObeNSrORr1ggJ+SU nBOHXJImuSEt0iacKPJMXsir9Wa9Wx/W5+/pmpX/HJMFWN8/OF alog==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oqFt wiIdYkbWwUAtcxHKpMZ2Oyg=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyB Lt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8Gn dGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVIYtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgs lY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N /hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3buxU69ULdz4sVeyanYGuEicnFZKjNSxb BXcU8EiBj1wyY/qOHeIgZhoFlzAvupGBkPEpm0A/oT5TYAZx1n hOzyLDMKAhaCokzUT4+xEzZcxMecmlYvhglr1U/M/rRzi+GsTC DyMEn6dBKCRkQYZrkUwBdCQ0ILK0OVDhU840QwQtKOM8EaNkm4 VAFUkUOniaL6pJuOcFMt3OWV5qlXTqNceuObeNSrORr1ggJ+SU nBOHXJImuSEt0iacKPJMXsir9Wa9Wx/W5+/pmpX/HJMFWN8/OF alog==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oqFt wiIdYkbWwUAtcxHKpMZ2Oyg=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyB Lt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8Gn dGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVIYtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgs lY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N /hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3buxU69ULdz4sVeyanYGuEicnFZKjNSxb BXcU8EiBj1wyY/qOHeIgZhoFlzAvupGBkPEpm0A/oT5TYAZx1n hOzyLDMKAhaCokzUT4+xEzZcxMecmlYvhglr1U/M/rRzi+GsTC DyMEn6dBKCRkQYZrkUwBdCQ0ILK0OVDhU840QwQtKOM8EaNkm4 VAFUkUOniaL6pJuOcFMt3OWV5qlXTqNceuObeNSrORr1ggJ+SU nBOHXJImuSEt0iacKPJMXsir9Wa9Wx/W5+/pmpX/HJMFWN8/OF alog==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oqFt wiIdYkbWwUAtcxHKpMZ2Oyg=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyB Lt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8Gn dGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVIYtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgs lY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N /hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3buxU69ULdz4sVeyanYGuEicnFZKjNSxb BXcU8EiBj1wyY/qOHeIgZhoFlzAvupGBkPEpm0A/oT5TYAZx1n hOzyLDMKAhaCokzUT4+xEzZcxMecmlYvhglr1U/M/rRzi+GsTC DyMEn6dBKCRkQYZrkUwBdCQ0ILK0OVDhU840QwQtKOM8EaNkm4 VAFUkUOniaL6pJuOcFMt3OWV5qlXTqNceuObeNSrORr1ggJ+SU nBOHXJImuSEt0iacKPJMXsir9Wa9Wx/W5+/pmpX/HJMFWN8/OF alog==</latexit>
{1, 3, 4}
<latexit sha1_base64="yFbvORIvZL6DqFXkqVZIfx47gpQ=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRVEl2SuHGJiTwMEDIdLjhhpm1mbjWk6Ve41Q/wa9wZXfontrULAc/q5Jx7c06OG0h h0La/rMLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39Qrhx2jB9qDm3uS1/3XGZACg/aKFBCL9DAlCuh686uU7/7CNoI37vDeQBDxaaemAjOMJHuB5FTu6g 1BvGoXLXrdga6SpycVEmO1qhiFQdjn4cKPOSSGdN37ACHEdMouIS4NAgNBIzP2BT6CfWYAjOMssYxPQ0NQ58GoKmQNBPh70fElDF z5SaXiuGDWfZS8T+vH+LkahgJLwgRPJ4GoZCQBRmuRTIF0LHQgMjS5kCFRznTDBG0oIzzRAyTbRYCVShRaP8pXlSTcNf1Zbqds7z UKumc1x277tw2qs1GvmKRHJMTckYcckma5Ia0SJtwosgzeSGv1pv1bn1Yn7+nBSv/OSILsL5/ADvSpaQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yFbvORIvZL6DqFXkqVZIfx47gpQ=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRVEl2SuHGJiTwMEDIdLjhhpm1mbjWk6Ve41Q/wa9wZXfontrULAc/q5Jx7c06OG0h h0La/rMLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39Qrhx2jB9qDm3uS1/3XGZACg/aKFBCL9DAlCuh686uU7/7CNoI37vDeQBDxaaemAjOMJHuB5FTu6g 1BvGoXLXrdga6SpycVEmO1qhiFQdjn4cKPOSSGdN37ACHEdMouIS4NAgNBIzP2BT6CfWYAjOMssYxPQ0NQ58GoKmQNBPh70fElDF z5SaXiuGDWfZS8T+vH+LkahgJLwgRPJ4GoZCQBRmuRTIF0LHQgMjS5kCFRznTDBG0oIzzRAyTbRYCVShRaP8pXlSTcNf1Zbqds7z UKumc1x277tw2qs1GvmKRHJMTckYcckma5Ia0SJtwosgzeSGv1pv1bn1Yn7+nBSv/OSILsL5/ADvSpaQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yFbvORIvZL6DqFXkqVZIfx47gpQ=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRVEl2SuHGJiTwMEDIdLjhhpm1mbjWk6Ve41Q/wa9wZXfontrULAc/q5Jx7c06OG0h h0La/rMLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39Qrhx2jB9qDm3uS1/3XGZACg/aKFBCL9DAlCuh686uU7/7CNoI37vDeQBDxaaemAjOMJHuB5FTu6g 1BvGoXLXrdga6SpycVEmO1qhiFQdjn4cKPOSSGdN37ACHEdMouIS4NAgNBIzP2BT6CfWYAjOMssYxPQ0NQ58GoKmQNBPh70fElDF z5SaXiuGDWfZS8T+vH+LkahgJLwgRPJ4GoZCQBRmuRTIF0LHQgMjS5kCFRznTDBG0oIzzRAyTbRYCVShRaP8pXlSTcNf1Zbqds7z UKumc1x277tw2qs1GvmKRHJMTckYcckma5Ia0SJtwosgzeSGv1pv1bn1Yn7+nBSv/OSILsL5/ADvSpaQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="yFbvORIvZL6DqFXkqVZIfx47gpQ=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRVEl2SuHGJiTwMEDIdLjhhpm1mbjWk6Ve41Q/wa9wZXfontrULAc/q5Jx7c06OG0h h0La/rMLa+sbmVnG7tLO7t39Qrhx2jB9qDm3uS1/3XGZACg/aKFBCL9DAlCuh686uU7/7CNoI37vDeQBDxaaemAjOMJHuB5FTu6g 1BvGoXLXrdga6SpycVEmO1qhiFQdjn4cKPOSSGdN37ACHEdMouIS4NAgNBIzP2BT6CfWYAjOMssYxPQ0NQ58GoKmQNBPh70fElDF z5SaXiuGDWfZS8T+vH+LkahgJLwgRPJ4GoZCQBRmuRTIF0LHQgMjS5kCFRznTDBG0oIzzRAyTbRYCVShRaP8pXlSTcNf1Zbqds7z UKumc1x277tw2qs1GvmKRHJMTckYcckma5Ia0SJtwosgzeSGv1pv1bn1Yn7+nBSv/OSILsL5/ADvSpaQ=</latexit>
{1, 2, 3, 4}
<latexit sha1_base64="/4LIg7NQkncIg/lDhO2f0BFj5/8=" >AAACKXicbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRFEl2SuHGJiTwSSsh0uOCEaaeZudWQhs9wqx/g17hTt/6Ibe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO1Pq7CxubW9U9wt7e0fHB6VK8ddoyLNocOVVLrvMQNSBNBBgRL6oQbmexJ63uwm9XuPoI1QwT3OQxj6bBqIieAME2ngxk6tUbu sNd3FqFy163YGuk6cnFRJjvaoYhXdseKRDwFyyYwZOHaIw5hpFFzCouRGBkLGZ2wKg4QGzAczjLPOC3oeGYaKhqCpkDQT4e9HzHx j5r6XXPoMH8yql4r/eYMIJ9fDWARhhBDwNAiFhCzIcC2SMYCOhQZEljYHKgLKmWaIoAVlnCdilKyzFOhHEoVWT4tlNQn3PCXT7Zz VpdZJt1F37Lpz16y2mvmKRXJKzsgFccgVaZFb0iYdwokiz+SFvFpv1rv1YX39nhas/OeELMH6/gEtU6YW</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="/4LIg7NQkncIg/lDhO2f0BFj5/8=" >AAACKXicbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRFEl2SuHGJiTwSSsh0uOCEaaeZudWQhs9wqx/g17hTt/6Ibe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO1Pq7CxubW9U9wt7e0fHB6VK8ddoyLNocOVVLrvMQNSBNBBgRL6oQbmexJ63uwm9XuPoI1QwT3OQxj6bBqIieAME2ngxk6tUbu sNd3FqFy163YGuk6cnFRJjvaoYhXdseKRDwFyyYwZOHaIw5hpFFzCouRGBkLGZ2wKg4QGzAczjLPOC3oeGYaKhqCpkDQT4e9HzHx j5r6XXPoMH8yql4r/eYMIJ9fDWARhhBDwNAiFhCzIcC2SMYCOhQZEljYHKgLKmWaIoAVlnCdilKyzFOhHEoVWT4tlNQn3PCXT7Zz VpdZJt1F37Lpz16y2mvmKRXJKzsgFccgVaZFb0iYdwokiz+SFvFpv1rv1YX39nhas/OeELMH6/gEtU6YW</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="/4LIg7NQkncIg/lDhO2f0BFj5/8=" >AAACKXicbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRFEl2SuHGJiTwSSsh0uOCEaaeZudWQhs9wqx/g17hTt/6Ibe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO1Pq7CxubW9U9wt7e0fHB6VK8ddoyLNocOVVLrvMQNSBNBBgRL6oQbmexJ63uwm9XuPoI1QwT3OQxj6bBqIieAME2ngxk6tUbu sNd3FqFy163YGuk6cnFRJjvaoYhXdseKRDwFyyYwZOHaIw5hpFFzCouRGBkLGZ2wKg4QGzAczjLPOC3oeGYaKhqCpkDQT4e9HzHx j5r6XXPoMH8yql4r/eYMIJ9fDWARhhBDwNAiFhCzIcC2SMYCOhQZEljYHKgLKmWaIoAVlnCdilKyzFOhHEoVWT4tlNQn3PCXT7Zz VpdZJt1F37Lpz16y2mvmKRXJKzsgFccgVaZFb0iYdwokiz+SFvFpv1rv1YX39nhas/OeELMH6/gEtU6YW</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="/4LIg7NQkncIg/lDhO2f0BFj5/8=" >AAACKXicbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EFunQzkZi4IKRFEl2SuHGJiTwSSsh0uOCEaaeZudWQhs9wqx/g17hTt/6Ibe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO1Pq7CxubW9U9wt7e0fHB6VK8ddoyLNocOVVLrvMQNSBNBBgRL6oQbmexJ63uwm9XuPoI1QwT3OQxj6bBqIieAME2ngxk6tUbu sNd3FqFy163YGuk6cnFRJjvaoYhXdseKRDwFyyYwZOHaIw5hpFFzCouRGBkLGZ2wKg4QGzAczjLPOC3oeGYaKhqCpkDQT4e9HzHx j5r6XXPoMH8yql4r/eYMIJ9fDWARhhBDwNAiFhCzIcC2SMYCOhQZEljYHKgLKmWaIoAVlnCdilKyzFOhHEoVWT4tlNQn3PCXT7Zz VpdZJt1F37Lpz16y2mvmKRXJKzsgFccgVaZFb0iYdwokiz+SFvFpv1rv1YX39nhas/OeELMH6/gEtU6YW</latexit>
{2, 3, 4}
<latexit sha1_base64="i52Ze0P1vpEbjENz/nfj3ocaPq8=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyBLt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8GndGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgslY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N/hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3blyvXlQ b7nxYqtg1OwNdJU5OKiRHa1i2Cu4o4JECH7lkxvQdO8RBzDQKLmFedCMDIeNTNoF+Qn2mwAzirPGcnkWGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi Z8pJLxfDBLHup+J/Xj3B8NYiFH0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6EhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNguBKpIodPA0X1STcM8LZLqds7z UKunUa45dc24blWYjX7FATsgpOScOuSRNckNapE04UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TNSv/OSYLsL5/AD2TpaU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="i52Ze0P1vpEbjENz/nfj3ocaPq8=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyBLt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8GndGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgslY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N/hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3blyvXlQ b7nxYqtg1OwNdJU5OKiRHa1i2Cu4o4JECH7lkxvQdO8RBzDQKLmFedCMDIeNTNoF+Qn2mwAzirPGcnkWGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi Z8pJLxfDBLHup+J/Xj3B8NYiFH0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6EhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNguBKpIodPA0X1STcM8LZLqds7z UKunUa45dc24blWYjX7FATsgpOScOuSRNckNapE04UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TNSv/OSYLsL5/AD2TpaU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="i52Ze0P1vpEbjENz/nfj3ocaPq8=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyBLt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8GndGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgslY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N/hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3blyvXlQ b7nxYqtg1OwNdJU5OKiRHa1i2Cu4o4JECH7lkxvQdO8RBzDQKLmFedCMDIeNTNoF+Qn2mwAzirPGcnkWGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi Z8pJLxfDBLHup+J/Xj3B8NYiFH0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6EhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNguBKpIodPA0X1STcM8LZLqds7z UKunUa45dc24blWYjX7FATsgpOScOuSRNckNapE04UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TNSv/OSYLsL5/AD2TpaU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="i52Ze0P1vpEbjENz/nfj3ocaPq8=" >AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ36RHyBLt1MJCYuCGmRRJckblxiIg9DCZkOF5ww0zYztxrS8BVu9QP8GndGl/6Jbe1CwLM6OefenJPjhVI YtO0va219Y3Nru7BT3N3bPzgslY86Jog0hzYPZKB7HjMghQ9tFCihF2pgypPQ9abXqd99BG1E4N/hLISBYhNfjAVnmEj3blyvXlQ b7nxYqtg1OwNdJU5OKiRHa1i2Cu4o4JECH7lkxvQdO8RBzDQKLmFedCMDIeNTNoF+Qn2mwAzirPGcnkWGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi Z8pJLxfDBLHup+J/Xj3B8NYiFH0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6EhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNguBKpIodPA0X1STcM8LZLqds7z UKunUa45dc24blWYjX7FATsgpOScOuSRNckNapE04UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TNSv/OSYLsL5/AD2TpaU=</latexit>
{1, 2, 4}
<latexit sha1_base64="GBne FQ9C1FWbbUaw26xpN4UhEWI=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EF unQzkZi4IKQlJLokceMSE3kYSsh0uOCEmbaZudWQhq9wqx/g17 gzuvRPbGsXAp7VyTn35pwcL5TCoG1/WYWNza3tneJuaW//4PCo XDnumiDSHDo8kIHue8yAFD50UKCEfqiBKU9Cz5tdp37vEbQRgX +H8xCGik19MRGcYSLdu7FTa9Sa7mJUrtp1OwNdJ05OqiRHe1Sx iu444JECH7lkxgwcO8RhzDQKLmFRciMDIeMzNoVBQn2mwAzjrP GCnkeGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi58pJLxfDBrHqp+J83iHByNYyF H0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6FhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNk uBKpIodPC0WFaTcM8LZLqds7rUOuk26o5dd26b1VYzX7FITskZ uSAOuSQtckPapEM4UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TgpX/nJAlWN8/Oh Olow==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="GBne FQ9C1FWbbUaw26xpN4UhEWI=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EF unQzkZi4IKQlJLokceMSE3kYSsh0uOCEmbaZudWQhq9wqx/g17 gzuvRPbGsXAp7VyTn35pwcL5TCoG1/WYWNza3tneJuaW//4PCo XDnumiDSHDo8kIHue8yAFD50UKCEfqiBKU9Cz5tdp37vEbQRgX +H8xCGik19MRGcYSLdu7FTa9Sa7mJUrtp1OwNdJ05OqiRHe1Sx iu444JECH7lkxgwcO8RhzDQKLmFRciMDIeMzNoVBQn2mwAzjrP GCnkeGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi58pJLxfDBrHqp+J83iHByNYyF H0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6FhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNk uBKpIodPC0WFaTcM8LZLqds7rUOuk26o5dd26b1VYzX7FITskZ uSAOuSQtckPapEM4UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TgpX/nJAlWN8/Oh Olow==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="GBne FQ9C1FWbbUaw26xpN4UhEWI=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EF unQzkZi4IKQlJLokceMSE3kYSsh0uOCEmbaZudWQhq9wqx/g17 gzuvRPbGsXAp7VyTn35pwcL5TCoG1/WYWNza3tneJuaW//4PCo XDnumiDSHDo8kIHue8yAFD50UKCEfqiBKU9Cz5tdp37vEbQRgX +H8xCGik19MRGcYSLdu7FTa9Sa7mJUrtp1OwNdJ05OqiRHe1Sx iu444JECH7lkxgwcO8RhzDQKLmFRciMDIeMzNoVBQn2mwAzjrP GCnkeGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi58pJLxfDBrHqp+J83iHByNYyF H0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6FhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNk uBKpIodPC0WFaTcM8LZLqds7rUOuk26o5dd26b1VYzX7FITskZ uSAOuSQtckPapEM4UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TgpX/nJAlWN8/Oh Olow==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="GBne FQ9C1FWbbUaw26xpN4UhEWI=">AAACJ3icbVDLTsJAFJ3iC/EF unQzkZi4IKQlJLokceMSE3kYSsh0uOCEmbaZudWQhq9wqx/g17 gzuvRPbGsXAp7VyTn35pwcL5TCoG1/WYWNza3tneJuaW//4PCo XDnumiDSHDo8kIHue8yAFD50UKCEfqiBKU9Cz5tdp37vEbQRgX +H8xCGik19MRGcYSLdu7FTa9Sa7mJUrtp1OwNdJ05OqiRHe1Sx iu444JECH7lkxgwcO8RhzDQKLmFRciMDIeMzNoVBQn2mwAzjrP GCnkeGYUBD0FRImonw9yNmypi58pJLxfDBrHqp+J83iHByNYyF H0YIPk+DUEjIggzXIpkC6FhoQGRpc6DCp5xphghaUMZ5IkbJNk uBKpIodPC0WFaTcM8LZLqds7rUOuk26o5dd26b1VYzX7FITskZ uSAOuSQtckPapEM4UeSZvJBX6816tz6sz9/TgpX/nJAlWN8/Oh Olow==</latexit>
Figure 1: Hasse diagram of the semilattice induced over the power set of {1, 2, 3, 4} using the union
operation as join. Taken two elements e, e′ of the lattice if e < e′, then e appears lower in the diagram
than e′ and there is an “upward” path, going from lower points to upper points, connecting e to e′ (e.g.,
{1} ≤ {1, 3, 4}, but {2} 6≤ {3}). Any two elements e, e′ of the semilattice have a join e⊕ e′ = e ∪ e′ and
e⊕ e′ ≥ e, e′ (e.g., {1}⊕{2, 3} = {1, 2, 3} ). The red edges indicate the chain (i.e., sequence of increasing
values) selected by the Lattice Agreement protocol.
2 Related Work
Lattice Agreement has been introduced by Attiya et al [4] to efficiently implement an atomic snapshot
object [9, 10]. Their construction is such that each scan or collect operation requires O(1) execution
of LA and uses O(n) read/write registers. Then Faleiro [2] have shown that GLA is a very interesting
abstraction to build RSMs with strong consistency properties, i.e., linearizability of its operations, and
liveness guarantees in asynchronous systems. Very recently Nowak and Rybicki [7] have studied LA in
presence of Byzantine faults. As previously introduced, their specifications of LA is more restrictive than
the one we propose since it does not allow decisions to contain values proposed by Byzantine processes.
We argue that our Lattice Agreement specification is more adapted to build RSM on top of the LA
algorithm. Removing a value proposed by a Byzantine process might not be desirable: think about an
RSM that implements an object shared by different organizations, it could be a breach of contract to
selectively avoid certain updates even when the sender misbehaved. A second reason is more technical
and it stems from the interaction between the impossibility results introduced by the specifications of [7]
and how an RSM is implemented using GLA [2]. Following [2] to implement the RSM we take the
power set of all possible updates and we construct a lattice on it using as join the union operation. As an
example, let us suppose that we want to build a set counter data type, and let us assume that clients issue
four update operations add(1), add(2), add(3), add(4) interleaved with reads. In this case our semilattice
is the one in Figure 1, and a Lattice Agreement algorithm will ensure that each read will see values on a
single chain, the red one in the figure. Thanks to this, different reads will see “growing” versions of the
counter that are consistent snapshots (e.g., if someone reads {1}, the other could read {1, 4}, but it can
not read {4}). Such a semilattice has a breadth1 of 4, actually, each semilattice obtained using as join
operation the union over the power set of a set of k different values has breadth k. Therefore to satisfy
the specifications of [7] using the semilattice in Figure 1 we should have at least 5 processes participating
to Lattice Agreement. Unfortunately, it is often the case that the number of possible update operations
is larger than the processes running the LA. In the set counter data type, we may have an add(x) for any
x ∈ N, in such setting the specifications of [7] is impossible to implement. Our specifications circumvent
such impossibility.
3 Model and Problem Definition
We have a set P : {p0, p1, . . . , pn−1} of processes. They communicate by exchanging messages over
asynchronous authenticated reliable point-to-point communication links (messages are never lost on
1Formally, the breadth of a semilattice L = (V,⊕) is the largest n, such taken any set of U ⊆ V of size n + 1 we have⊕
U =
⊕
K where K is a proper subset of U .
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links, but delays are unbounded). The communication graph is complete: there is a communication link
between each pair of processes.
We have a set F ⊂ P of Byzantine processes, with |F | ≤ f . Byzantine processes deviate arbitrarily
from the algorithm. We assume |P | ≥ 3f + 1 (we show that such assumption is needed in Section 4).
In Section 8, we assume that there exists a public-key infrastructure, and that each process is able
to sign a message, in such a way that each other process is able to unambiguously verify such signature.
In this case Byzantine processes are not able to forge a valid signature for a process in C = P \ F (that
is the computational capability of processes in F is polynomially bounded). We remark that signatures
are only used in the algorithms presented in Section 8.
3.1 The Byzantine Lattice Agreement Problem
Each process pi ∈ C starts with an initial input value proi ∈ V . Values in V form a join semi-lattice
L = (V,⊕) for some commutative join operation ⊕: for each u, v ∈ V we have u ≤ v if and only if
v = u⊕ v. Given V ′ = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} ⊆ V we have
⊕
V ′ = v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ . . .⊕ vk.
The task that processes in C want to solve is the one of Lattice Agreement, and it is formalised by
the following properties:
• Liveness: Each process pi ∈ C eventually outputs a decision value deci ∈ V ;
• Stability: Each process pi ∈ C outputs a unique decision value deci ∈ V ;
• Comparability: Given any two pair pi, pj ∈ C we have that either deci ≤ decj or decj ≤ deci;
• Inclusivity: Given any correct process pi ∈ C we have that proi ≤ deci;
• Non-Triviality: Given any correct process pi ∈ C we have that deci ≤
⊕
(X ∪ B), where X is
the set of proposed values of all correct processes (X : {proi| with pi ∈ C}), and B ⊂ V is |B| ≤ f .
In the rest of the paper we will assume that L is a semi-lattice over sets (V is a set of sets) and
⊕ is the set union operation. This is not restrictive, it is well known [11] that any join semi-lattice is
isomorphic to a semi-lattice of sets with set union as join operation.
4 Necessity of at least (3f + 1) processes
We first show that our specification can only be satisfied when there are at least (3f + 1) processes.
Interestingly, this bound holds even if we weaken our specification by removing Inclusivity property.
Theorem 1. Let A be any asynchronous distributed, and Byzantine tolerant algorithm that solves Byzan-
tine Lattice Agreement when f processes are Byzantine. We have that A needs at least (3f+1) processes.
This holds even if we drop the Inclusivity property from the specification.
Proof. (Sketch) We first show the result for f = 1. Let A be a correct algorithm using 3 processes and
tolerating a Byzantine process. The processes are {p1, p2, pbiz}, and pbiz is the Byzantine. Let us first
consider a run where we delay the messages between p1 and p2. Still A has to make p1 and p2 decide
before they exchange any message: each one of them could not exclude that the other is the Byzantine
process. Therefore p1 has to make a decision seeing only its value v1 and vbiz. Also p2 sees only values
v2 and vbiz. Now we have the following possibilities:
• Each of them outputs a decision that contains both values, but then decisions are not comparable.
• Each of them outputs a decision that contains only its proposed value, but then the decisions are
not comparable.
• Each of them outputs a decision that contains only the Byzantine value. This last case is the only
one that makes the algorithm correct in the above execution.
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Now let us take a symmetric execution in which p1 and p2 communicate and pbiz does not send any
message. Also in such a case p1 has to make a decision seeing values v1 and v2, while p2 sees only values
v2 and v1. However by symmetry each of them will output the value of the other, making incomparable
decisions. For f > 1 we use the standard simulation argument: given an algorithm that solves the
problem with 3f processes we could simulate it using only 3 processes (each of the three internally runs
f copies).
5 Algorithm Wait Till Safe (WTS)
The Wait Till Safe algorithm (Algorithms 1 and 2) is divided in two phases: an initial Values Disclosure
Phase where processes are asked to declare to the whole system values they intend to propose, and then
a Deciding Phase where processes agree on which elements of the lattice can be decided on the basis of
the proposed values. For the sake of clarity, processes are divided in proposers that propose an initial
value, and then decide one decision value, and acceptors which help proposers decide. This distinction
does not need to be enforced during deployment as each process can play both roles at the same time.
The main idea in the Values Disclosure Phase is to make any proposer disclose its proposed value
by performing a Byzantine reliable broadcast. The reliable broadcast prevents Byzantine processes from
sending different messages to processes [12, 13]. The exact specification of this broadcast is in [14]. In
the pseudocode the broadcast primitive is represented by the ReliableBrodcast (used for reliably
broadcast messages) function and RBcastDelivery event (that indicates the delivery of a message
sent with the reliable broadcast).
Values delivered at each process are saved in a SvS (Safe-values Set). A process moves to the next
phase as soon as he receives values from at least (n− f) proposers. Waiting for (n− f) messages is not
strictly necessary, but allows us to show a bound of O(f) on the message delays of our algorithm. Note
that, from this point on, some operations of Phase 1 could run in parallel with Phase 2. Thanks to
Value Disclosure Phase a process is committed to its value and cannot change its proposal or introduce
a new one during the Deciding Phase. During this latter phase, correct processes only handle messages
that contain values in SvS, i.e. messages for which the SAFE() predicate is true. Messages that do not
satisfy this condition are buffered for later use, i.e. if and when all the values they contain will be in
SvS.
The Deciding Phase is an extension of the algorithm described in [2] with a Byzantine quorum and
additional checks used to thwart Byzantine attacks. Each correct proposer p sends its Proposed value to
acceptors in a request message (Line 18). An acceptor receiving a request, sends an ack if the previously
Accepted set is a subset of the value contained in the request, and updates its Accepted set using the
Proposed set in the request (initially, the Accepted set of an acceptor is the empty set). Otherwise, the
acceptor sends a nack containing the Accepted set, and it updates its Accepted set with the union of the
value contained in p’s request and its Accepted set. The proposer p decides if it receives b(n+ f)/2c+ 1
acks. In case p receives a nack, then p updates Proposed set by taking the union of it and the value
contained in the nack. Each time a proposer updates its Proposed set set it issues a new request.
5.1 WTS properties
5.1.1 Safety properties
Observation 1. Given any correct process pj its SvS contains at most one value for each process in P .
The above observation derives from the specification of reliable broadcast, and the fact that in the
disclosure phase each participating process broadcasts a single value. We say that a message m containing
a set of proposed values is “safe” for a process pi if such set of values is contained in SvS. It is immediate
from function at Lines 35-39 that proposers (in state proposing) change their Proposed set only when
they receive safe messages. The analogous holds for the Accepted set of acceptors.
We say that a value v receives m acks if it is contained in a Proposed set, that is in turn contained
in ack messages in the form < ack, ·, ts > sent by m acceptors. The same meaning is intended when we
say that Proposed set receives acks.
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Algorithm 1 WTS (Wait Till Safe) -Algorithm for Proposer process pi
1: proposed value = proi
2: init counter = ts = 0
3: Proposed set = Ack set = SvS =Waiting msgs = ∅
4: state = disclosing
5: . Values Disclosure Phase
6: upon event proposed value 6= ⊥
7: Proposed set = Proposed set ∪ proposed value
8: ReliableBroadcast(< disclosure phase, proposed value >) to all
9: upon event RBcastDelivery from sender( < disclosure phase, value >)
10: if value is a elment of the lattice then
11: if state = disclosing then
12: Proposed set = Proposed set ∪ value
13: SvS = SvS ∪ {value}
14: init counter = init counter + 1
15: . Deciding Phase
16: upon event init counter ≥ (n− f) when state = disclosing
17: state = proposing
18: Broadcast(< ack req, Proposed set, r >) to all Acceptors
19: upon event Delivery from sender(m)
20: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs ∪ {m}
21: upon event ∃m ∈ Waiting msgs |SAFE(m) ∧ state = proposing ∧ m =< ack, ·, tstamp > ∧tstamp = ts from
sender
22: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs \ {m}
23: Ack set = Ack set ∪ {< ack, sender >}
24: upon event ∃m ∈ Waiting msgs |SAFE(m) ∧ state = proposing ∧m =< nack,Rcvd set, tstamp > ∧tstamp = ts
from sender
25: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs \ {m}
26: if Rcvd set ∪ Proposed set 6= Proposed set then
27: Proposed set = Rcvd set ∪ Proposed set
28: Ack set = ∅
29: ts = ts+ 1
30: Broadcast(< ack req, Proposed set, ts >) to all Acceptors
31: upon event |Ack set| ≥ b(n+ f)/2c+ 1 when state = proposing
32: state = decided
33: decisioni = Proposed set
34: DECIDE(decisioni)
35: function SAFE(m)
36: if the lattice element contained in m is a subset of SvS then
37: return True
38: else
39: return False
Algorithm 2 WTS (Wait Till Safe) - Algorithm for Acceptor process pi
1: Accepted set =Waiting msgs = ∅
2: SvS . Reference to SvS in the corresponding Proposer
3: upon event Delivery from sender(m)
4: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs ∪ {m}
5: upon event ∃m ∈Waiting msgs |SAFE(m) ∧m =< ack req,Rcvd set, x > from sender
6: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs \ {m}
7: if Accepted set ⊆ Rcvd set then
8: Accepted set = Rcvd set
9: Send to sender (< ack,Accepted set, x >)
10: else
11: Send to sender (< nack,Accepted set, x >)
12: Accepted set = Accepted set ∪Rcvd set
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Definition 1. (Commited value) A value v is commited if it received b(n + f)/2c+ 1 acks.
Definition 2. (Commited proposal) A Proposed set is commited if it received b(n + f)/2c+ 1 acks.
Lemma 1. Let t be the first time at which a value v is commited, we have that any Proposed set
committed after t contains v.
Proof. Value v received at least b(n − f)/2c + 1 acks from acceptors in C (see Alg. 1 Line 37). These
acceptors have inserted v in their Accepted set (see Alg. 2 Line 8). Thus by time t a set Q1 ⊆ C has v in
their Accepted set. Let Proposed set be a value committed after t, then, by the same above reasoning, we
have that Proposed set received acks from a set of correct acceptors Q2 ⊆ C, with |Q2| ≥ b(n−f)/2c+1.
Since ∃p ∈ Q1∩Q2 (recall that |C| = (n−f)) we have that Proposed set contains v: p sent an ack, thus
has passed the if at Line 7 of Alg 2.
Observation 2. Given any correct process pj its decisionj has been committed.
Theorem 2. Let us consider a set of processes, of size at least (3f + 1), executing WTS algorithm.
Algorithm WTS enforces: (1) Comparability; (2) Inclusivity; (3) Non-Triviality; (4) Stability.
Proof. We prove each property separately.
1. is implied by Lemma 1 and Observation 2.
2. derives from the fact that a proposer never removes a value from Proposed set and from Line 7.
3. the bound on B derives from the safety of messages and Observation 1, the fact that deci ≤⊕
(X ∪ B) derives from the fact that a correct process insert in its proposal only values received
by messages and its initial proposed value.
4. is ensured by Line 32 in proposers.
Note that the Inclusivity and the Comparability imply that, when all correct proposers decide than
each value proposed by some correct will be in a decision and that there exists a proposer whose decision
includes all values proposed by correct proposers.
5.1.2 Liveness properties
Lemma 2. Each message sent by a correct process is eventually safe for any other correct process.
Proof. If a correct process pi sent a message m then the set of values contained in m is a subset of SvS
of pi. Note that SvS is only updated as result of the reception of a message reliably broadcast in the
disclosure phase (Line 13). From the properties of the broadcast eventually each other correct process
will obtain a SvS that contains the set of values in m, making m safe.
Lemma 3. A correct proposer refines its proposal (executing Line 30) at most f times.
Proof. Each time the proposer executes Line 30 it passes the if at Line 26, thus increasing its proposed
set. However, its first proposal, in Line 18, contains at least |X ∪B| − f values. Since there are at most
|X ∪B| safe values (from Oservation 1), the claim follows.
Lemma 4. If there is a time t after which a correct proposer pi in state proposing cannot execute
Line 30, then pi eventually decides.
Proof. Let < ack req, Proposed set, ts > be the last ack request message sent by pi. Since pi does not
execute Line 30 it means that either pi does not receive any nack, or that any nack pi receives does not
allow him to pass the if Line 26. Since pi is correct its message < ack req, Proposed set, ts > will reach
each correct acceptor. By hypothesis each of them will send a ack, otherwise pi should be able to execute
Line 30 (they all handle the ack request by Lemma 2). Once pi receives the acks from the set of correct
acceptors will handle them: these messages are safe since the element of the lattice inside each of them
is equal to Proposed set in ack req and, thus pi decides.
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In the next Theorem (Th. 3) we will show that each correct process eventually commits and decides,
we also bound the number of delays needed, by each correct proposer, to reach a decision.
Theorem 3. Let us consider a set of processes, of size at least (3f + 1), executing WTS algorithm.
Every correct proposer decides in at most 2f + 5 message delays.
Proof. The reliable broadcast at Line 8 takes at most 3 message delays. Therefore after three rounds
each correct process start its first proposal. Each refinement takes at most 2 message delay, the time
needed to broadcast and receive a response. There are f refinements, see Lemma 3, executed in at most
2f + 2 message delays, and thus by Lemma 4 after 2f + 5 message delays a correct decides.
Note that Theorem 3 implies the Liveness property of our Lattice Agreement specification.
5.1.3 Message complexity
The Byzantine reliable broadcast used at Line 8 costs O(n2) messages [14], this cost dominates the other
algorithm operations: in the 2f + 5 delays needed to reach the decision at most O(f · n) messages are
generated.
6 Algorithm Generalized Wait Till Safe (GWTS)
6.1 The Generalised Byzantine Lattice Agreement Problem
In the generalised version of our problem, each process pi receives, asynchronously, input values from an
infinite sequence Proi = 〈pro0, pro1, pro2, . . .〉.
• Liveness: each correct process pi ∈ C performs an infinite sequence of decisions Deci = 〈dec0, dec1, dec2, . . .〉;
• Local Stability: For each pi ∈ C its sequence of decisions is non decreasing (i.e., dech ⊆ dech+1,
for any dech ∈ Deci);
• Comparability: Any two decisions of correct processes are comparable, even when they happen
on different processes;
• Inclusivity: Given any correct process pi ∈ C, if Proi contains a value prok, then prok is eventually
included in dech ∈ Deci;
• Non-Triviality: Given any correct process pi ∈ C if pi outputs some decision deck at time t, then
deck ≤
⊕
(Prop[0 : h] ∪B[0 : b]). Where:
Prop[0 : h] is the union of the prefixes, until index h, of all sequences Proi of correct processes;
and, B[0 : b] is the union of all prefixes, until index b, of f infinite sequences Bi, one for each
Byzantine process.
Intuitively, with Non-Triviality we are bounding the number of values that the Byzantine processes
could insert in any decision to a finite number of values.
6.2 Algorithm Description
The pseudocode of GWTS is in Algorithms 3-4.
The Generalized Wait Till Safe algorithm is an extension of the WTS algorithm based on the same
batching approach proposed in [2]. Input values at proposers are batched until a new decision round
starts. Each decision round follows the two-phases approach of WTS. Note that rounds are executed
asynchronously at each proposer.2
Compared to WTS, an additional challenge to be faced is to prevent adversarial processes from
indefinitely postpone the decision correct processes. A uncareful design could allow byzantine proposers
2The Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive used in [14] is designed to avoid possible confusion of messages in round
based algorithms. That is exactly what we need.
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Algorithm 3 GWTS -Algorithm for proposer process pi
1: proposed value = proi
2: Batch[∀r ∈ N] = SvS[∀k ∈ N] = ∅ . Array of value sets, one batch for each round
3: Counter[∀r ∈ N] = 0 . Array of numbers, one for each round
4: r = −1
5: ts = 0
6: Proposed set = Decided set =Waiting msgs = Ack history = ∅
7: state = newround
8: upon event new value(v)
9: Batch[r + 1] = Batch[r + 1] ∪ {v}
10: . Values Disclosure Phase
11: upon event state = newround
12: state = disclosing
13: r = r + 1
14: Proposed set = Proposed set ∪Batch[r]
15: ReliableBroadcast(< disclosure phase,Batch[r], r >) to all
16: upon event RBcastDelivery from sender(< disclosure phase, Set, round >)
17: if state = disclosing∧ Set is an element of the lattice then
18: Proposed set = Proposed set ∪ Set
19: SvS[round] = SvS[round] ∪ Set
20: Counter[round] = Counter[round] + 1
21: . Deciding Phase
22: upon event Counter[r] ≥ (n− f) when state = disclosing
23: state = proposing
24: ts = ts+ 1
25: Broadcast(< ack req, Proposed set, ts, r >) to all Acceptors
26: upon event Delivery or RBcastDelivery from sender(m)
27: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs ∪ {m}
28: upon event ∃m ∈Waiting msgs|SAFE(m) ∧ state = proposing ∧m =< nack,Rcvd set, ts′, r′ > ∧ts′ = ts ∧ r′ = r
29: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs \ {m}
30: if Rcvd set ∪ Proposed set 6= Proposed set then
31: Proposed set = Rcvd set ∪ Proposed set
32: ts = ts+ 1
33: Broadcast(< ack req, Proposed set, ts, r >) to all Acceptors
34: upon event ∃m ∈ Waiting msgs|SAFE(m) ∧ state = proposing ∧ m =<
ack,Accepted set, destination, sender, timestamp, round > ∧m was delivered with RBcastDelivery
35: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs \ {m}
36: Ack history = Ack history ∪ {< ack,Accepted set, destination, sender, timestamp, round,>}
37: upon event < ack,Accepted set, destination, ·, timestamp, round > appears b(n+ f)/2c+ 1 times in Ack history
38: if Decided set ⊆ Accepted set and state = proposing ∧ round = r then
39: Decide(Accepted set)
40: Decided set = Accepted set
41: state = newround
42: upon event SAFE(m)
43: if the lattice element contained in m is a subset of SvS[r] then
44: return True
45: else
46: return False
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Algorithm 4 GWTS - Algorithm for Acceptor process pi
1: Accepted set =Waiting msgs = Ack history = ∅
2: SvS[] . Reference to SvS in the corresponding Proposer
3: Safe r = 0 . Max round for which it is safe to process messages
4: upon event Delivery or RBCastDelivery from sender(m)
5: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs ∪ {m}
6: upon event ∃m ∈Waiting msgs|SAFEA(m) ∧ r ≤ Safe r ∧m =< ack req,Rcvd set, ts, r >
7: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs \ {m}
8: if Accepted set ≤ Rcvd set then
9: Accepted set = Rcvd set
10: ReliableBroadcast(< ack,Accepted set, sender, pi, ts, r >) to all
11: else
12: Send to sender (< nack,Accepted set, ts, r >)
13: Accepted set = Accepted set ∪Rcvd set
14: upon event ∃m ∈Waiting msgs|SAFEA(m)∧r ≤ Safe r∧m =< ack,Accepted set, destination, sender, ts, r > ∧m
was delivered with RBcastDelivery
15: Waiting msgs =Waiting msgs \ {m}
16: Ack history = Ack history ∪ {< ack,Accepted set, destination, sender, ts, r, >}
17: upon event < ack,Accepted set, destination, ·, ts, r > appears b(n+ f)/2c+ 1 times in Ack history
18: if r = Safe r then
19: Safe r = Safe r + 1
20: upon event SAFEA(m)
21: if ∃r such that the lattice element contained in m is a subset of SvS[r] then
22: return True
23: else
24: return False
to continuously pretend to have decided, thus jumping to new rounds, and clogging the proposers with a
continuous stream of new values. This would make acceptors to continuously nack proposals of correct
processes. We solve this problem through the acceptors. Acceptors will help a new proposal to be decided
in round r ≥ 1 when, and if, in round (r − 1) a proposal has been accepted by at least a (Byzantine)
quorum of acceptors (i.e., safe r = r ). In order for this to work we make acceptors to reliably broadcast
their ack messages, in this way the acceptance of proposals is made public. Any correct proposer can
decide, in a round r, any proposal that has been correctly accepted in round r, even if it was not proposed
by itself (provided that such decision preserves the Local Stability).
6.3 GWTS properties
6.3.1 Safety properties
The proof of the safety properties of GWTS is analogous to the proof contained in Section 5.1.1. From
the properties of reliable broadcast we have the following:
Observation 3. For each correct process pi and each round r, the set SvS[r] contains at most n sets.
Theorem 4. Let us consider a set of processes, of size (3f + 1), executing GWTS algorithm. Algorithm
GWTS enforces: (1) Comparability; (2) Non-Triviality; (3) Stability.
Proof. We prove each property separately.
1. is implied by Lemma 1 and Observation 2.
2. For the Non-Triviality we have to show that for each correct proposer pi and each deck ∈ Deci
it holds dect ≤
⊕
(Prop[0 : h] ∪ B[0 : b]). First notice that dect may only contain values that
are present in
⋃
r′∈[0,r] SvS[r
′] with r rounds in which deck happens. This derives from the fact
that a correct process, at a given round, only handles messages that contain safe values. Let
Wr =
⋃
r′∈[0,r] SvS[r
′], it is immediate to see that Wr contains at most the union of all values in
the prefixes Propi[0 : h] from some index h, which correspond precisely to all values proposed by
correct processes until round r. It is also immediate that Wr contains at most the union of all values
that Byzantine proposers have reliably broadcast in the first r disclosure phases: this is equivalent
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to say that it contains a prefix of all the infinite sequences of values that Byzantine cumulatively
broadcast in the disclosure phases of our algorithm. From these arguments the Non-Triviality
follows.
3. is ensured by line 38 in proposers.
6.3.2 Liveness
We say that a correct process pi joins a round r if it sends a message < disclosure phase, ·, r >. Similarly
a correct process pi proposes a Set at round r if it sends a message < ack req, Set, ·, r >.
We say that a message m is safe for a process pi at round r, if SvS[r] of pi contains of all values
contained in m.
Lemma 5. Each message sent by a correct process at round r is eventually safe, at round r, for any
other correct process.
Proof. Same of Lemma 2
Definition 3. We say that a round r has a “legitimate end” if there exists a proposal that has been
committed at round r.
(See Definition 2 of committed proposal)
Definition 4. Round r is a legit round, at time t, if, either, r is 0 or (r− 1) had a legitimate end before
time t.
Definition 5. An acceptor trusts round r if its Safe r ≥ r.
Lemma 6. If r is a legit round, then eventually any correct acceptor will trust round r.
Proof. The proof is by induction on r.
• Base case: for round r = 0 each acceptor has Safe r initialized to 0.
• Inductive case: By inductive hypothesis we have that eventually any acceptor sets Safe r = r−1.
Moreover, we have that, by definition of legit, round (r − 1) had a legitimated end. This means
that 2f +1 acceptors reliably broadcast < ack,Accepted set, destination, ·, ts, r−1 >, and at least
one of them is correct process p, thus the message < ack,Accepted set, destination, ·, ts, r− 1 > is
safe for p at round (r− 1) . Any acceptor with Safe r = r− 1 upon receipt of these messages will
eventually process them, by Lemma 5, and it will set Safe r = r, see procedure starting at line 17.
Note that by Lemma 6 we have that any legit round will be eventually trusted by all acceptors.
Moreover, we can show that if r is a non-legit round at time t than it will not be trusted, at time t, by
any correct acceptor.
Lemma 7. If r is a non-legit round, at time t, that is, r 6= 0 and (r − 1) has not had a legitimate end
before time t, then any correct acceptor has Safe r < r.
Proof. The proof derives immediately from the definition of legitimate end and from line 17 in the
acceptor code.
Definition 6. A value v has been disseminated, by time t, if, by time t, it was contained in a safe
ack req message for some round r and it has been received by b(n + f)/2c + 1 correct acceptors that
trusted round r.
The observation below is a strengthen version of Lemma 1.
Observation 4. If a value v has been disseminated by time t, then any proposal committed after time t
will contain v.
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Proof. The proof is immediate by observing that a disseminated value is in the Accepted set of b(n −
f)/2c+ 1 correct acceptors (either by line 9 or 13 of Algorithm 4), and by using the same argument of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 8. If round r has a legitimate end and at least (n − f) correct proposers joined round r, then
eventually any correct proposer, that joined round r, will decide in round r, and join round (r + 1) .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let pi be a correct process that joined round r but has not yet
decided in round r. Note that pi has to be in state proposing: by hypothesis (n− f) correct proposers
joined r, thus the guard at line 22 has to be eventually triggered.
Since r has a legitimate end then there are b(n + f)/2c + 1 reliable broadcast of messages <
ack,Accepted set, destination, ·, ts, r >, and at least one of them has been generated by a correct process
p, thus it is safe for p at round r. By Observation 4 we have that Decide set ⊆ Accepted set, and, by
Lemma 5, upon receipt of these messages pi decides and joins round (r + 1) .
Lemma 9. If r is a legit round, then any correct proposer eventually joins it.
Proof. The proof is by induction on round number.
• Base case: round r = 0, by assumption it is a legit round, and by algorithm construction each
correct proposer joins r = 0.
• Inductive case: The inductive hypothesis is that (r − 1) is a legit round and that each correct
proposer joined it. We assume that r is a legit round, thus round (r − 1) had a legitimate end.
Lemma 8 and the inductive hypothesis imply that any correct proposer joins r.
Lemma 10. If r is a legit round, then it will eventually have a legitimate end. Moreover, each correct
proposer executes line 31, while its round variable is r, at most f times (that is it refines its proposal at
most f times during its participation to round r).
Proof. First observe, by Lemma 6 that each correct acceptor eventually trusts round r. Then observe
that, until r does not have a legitimate end, by Lemma 7, no correct acceptor will trust any round r′ > r.
Thus they will not process any message coming from round r′.
The above and Observation 3 bound the number of changes that correct acceptors perform in round
r on their Accepted set to a finite number. Therefore, there exists a time t after which each correct
acceptor does not change anymore its Accepted set.
If a correct proposer, that joined round r, issues an ack req after time t, then, by Lemma 5, and the
above reasoning we have that such request will be committed. Once committed round r has a legitimate
end. Now by Lemma 9 we have that eventually any correct proposer joins round r. It remains to show
that some correct process issues a request after time t. Note that, when joining a new round, each correct
process proposes its value. This proposal either is committed or refined (upon execution of line 31). In
case of refinement a new set is immediately proposed. This ensures that either something was committed
in round r before time t, or that something will be proposed after t. In both cases round r will have a
legitimate end. Recall that all correct proposers eventually join round r (by Lemma 9), each of them
only proposes the value constituted by Batch[r], by the property of the Byzantine reliable broadcast and
by the safety of messages also Byzantines are constrained to propose at most f different values in round
r. This means that a decision in round r can contain at most n new values with respect to the decision
at round (r − 1) . Since when a correct proposer executes line 25 it passed the guard at line 22, it is
obvious that there at most f values missing in its proposal. From this Lemma 10, and thus the bound
on the number of executions of line 31, follows immediately.
Lemma 11. If a correct process pi joins a round r at time t, it also proposes, in round r, all values in
Proi received before time t.
Proof. Observe that a correct process joins a round r only if (r−1) had a legitimate end. From Lemma 9
we have that all correct processes will eventually join round r, thus the if at line 22 will be passed. From
the above, the atomicity of the local procedures, and the fact that a correct process cumulates in its
Proposed set all previous batches never removing any value (see line 18), our claim follows.
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From Lemma 11 we have the following observation:
Observation 5. Given any correct process pi ∈ C and any value v ∈ Proi, we have that v is eventually
disseminated.
Theorem 5. Let us consider a set of processes, of size (3f + 1), executing GWTS algorithm. We have
that any run of GWTS ensures the following liveness properties:
1. Liveness: each correct process pi ∈ C performs an infinite sequence of decisions Deci = {dec0, dec1, dec2, . . .}
2. Inclusivity: Given any correct process pi ∈ C, if Proi contains a value v then, v is eventually
included in one decision in Deci;
Proof. We prove each property separately:
1. Liveness: it is enough to show that there is an infinite sequence of legit rounds. This derives from
Lemma 10, combining it with Lemma 8 and a simple induction on the round number. Lemmas 8, 9
ensure that in each round of such sequence all correct proposers decide.
2. Inclusivity: it derives from Observations 5, 4 and the fact that the sequence of decisions is infinite
(see above).
6.4 Message Complexity
GWTS executes a possibly infinite sequence of decisions. Thus, we restrict our message complexity
analysis to the number of messages needed for each decision. The messages are counted per proposer,
we include messages created by correct acceptors in response to proposer actions. Each proposer decides
exactly once for each algorithm round. Therefore, we count messages from start to end of a generic
round. A proposer has to reliably broadcast its batch (line 15 -cost O(n2)), it has to broadcast its
proposal (line 25 - cost O(n)), then, in the worst case, it refines its proposal at most f times (see Lemma
10 -line 33 - cost O(n)), however each ack from a correct acceptor has to be reliably broadcast (line 10
- cost O(n2)). The total cost is therefore upper-bounded by O(f · n2).
7 Byzantine tolerant RSM
We are interested in wait-free implementations of linearizable replicated state machines for commutative
update operations in the Byzantine model.
7.1 Specification of the Byzantine tolerant RSM
The replicated state machine is composed of n replicas, which start in the initial empty state s0. Among
them, up to f ≤ (n − 1)/3 replicas may exhibit Byzantine failures. The RSM exposes two operations,
update and read, such that the update operation with command cmd modifies the current state s of the
RSM by applying cmd to s but does not return any value, while the read operation returns the current
state of the RSM. The state of the RSM at time t is a set of update commands applied to the initial
state s0 until time t. Note that being the RSM commutative the order in which updates are applied
does not matter. Clients may trigger an infinite number of read and update operations. We assume
that each command is unique (which can be easily done by tagging it with the identifier of the client
and a sequence number). We do not make any assumptions regarding clients behavior: they can exhibit
arbitrary behaviors (e.g., invoke an update operation with some arbitrary command, or modify the read
and update code). We do not limit the number of Byzantine clients. Hence, to prevent Byzantine clients
from jeopardizing the state of the RSM through arbitrary commands, commands are locally executed by
clients: the RSM provides clients with a set of updates and clients locally execute them. For readibility
reasons, the value returned by the execution of a set of commands is equal to the set of commands. The
following properties formalise the behavior of read and update operations during any execution run by
correct clients:
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• Liveness Any update and read operation completes;
• Read Validity: Any value returned by a read reflects a state of the RSM;
• Read Consistency: Any two values returned by any two reads are comparable;
• Read Monotonicity: For any two reads r1 and r2 returning value v1 and v2 respectively, if r1
completes before r2 is triggered then v1 ⊆ v2;
• Update Stability: If update u1 completes before update u2 is triggered then every read that
returns a value that includes the command of u2 also include the command of u1;
• Update Visibility: If update u completes before read r is triggered then the value returned by
r includes the command of u.
7.2 Implementation of the Byzantine tolerant RSM
As previously introduced, our general idea to implement a wait-free and linearizable replicated state
machine resilient to Byzantine failures in an asynchronous system is to apply Generalized Lattice Agree-
ment on the power set of all the update commands. GWTS is executed by the replicas of the state
machine (for simplicity reasons replicas play the role of both proposers and acceptors). The update
and read operations are presented in Algorithms 5 and 6 respectively. The update operation consists in
submitting the new command cmd to generalized Lattice Agreement so that eventually the new state
of each (correct) replica includes cmd. This is achieved by triggering the execution of new value with
{cmd} as parameter at any subset of (f + 1) replicas (so that at least one correct replica will execute it),
see Line 3. The update operation completes when some correct replica modifies its local state with cmd,
that is, decides a decision value that includes cmd (Line 4). This preserves the order of non-overlapping
update operations. The read operation consists in an update operation followed by a confirmation step.
The update is triggered with a special value nop that locally modifies a replica’s state as for an ordi-
nary command cmd but is equivalent to a nop operation when executed. When the update completes,
any decision value decided by a correct replica can be returned by the read operation. Since up to f
Byzantine replicas may provide any value, a confirmation request for each of these (f +1) decision values
is sent to all replicas (Line 8). A replica acknowledges Accepted set if Accepted set has been accepted
by b(n + f)/2c + 1 acceptors, which ensures that Accepted set has effectively been decided in GWTS
(Line 4 of Alg. 7). The value returned by the read operation is the result of the execution of the first
decision value confirmed by f + 1 replicas, i.e, the first decision value confirmed by at least one correct
replica. This ensures that a read operation will return a value that reflects the effect of the last update
operation. From an implementation point of view, the confirmation step requires to add two lines of
code in Algorithm 3. Specifically, when a proposer receives a confirmation request for decision value
Accepted set, then it acknowledges the request if < ack,Accepted set, ·, ·, ts, r > appears b(n+ f)/2c+ 1
times in its Ack history set for a fixed combination of ts and round r. See Code in Alg. 7.
Algorithm 5 Replicated State Machine - Update algorithm at a client
1: procedure Update(cmd)
2: DecSet = ∅
3: new value ({cmd}) at (f + 1) replicas
4: wait until |DecSet| ≥ f + 1
5: upon event Receipt from replica < decide, Accepted set, replica > with cmd ∈ Accepted set
6: DecSet = DecSet ∪ < decide, Accepted set, replica >
Theorem 6. Given the wait-free Byzantine generalized Lattice Agreement (GLA) algorithm whose pseu-
docode is given in Alg. 3, 4 and 7, the above transformation yields a wait-free linearizable replicated state
machine for commutative update operations. This transformation requires one execution of the Byzantine
GLA algorithm.
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Algorithm 6 Replicated State Machine - Read algorithm at client c
1: procedure Read
2: DecSet = ConfSet = ∅
3: new value ({nopc,r}) at (f + 1) replicas
4: upon event Receipt from replica < decide, Accepted set, replica > with nopc,r ∈ Accepted set
5: DecSet = DecSet ∪ < decide, Accepted set, replica >
6: upon event |DecSet| ≥ f + 1
7: for all Accepted set ∈ DecSet do
8: Send(< CnfReq, Accepted set >) to all replicas
9: upon event Receipt from replica < CnfRep, Accepted set, replica >
10: ConfSet = ConfSet ∪ < CnfRep, Accepted set, replica >
11: upon event < CnfRep, Accepted set, . > appears (f + 1) times in ConfSet
12: return execute (Accepted set)
Algorithm 7 GWTS - proposer pi code plug-in for supporting RSM
1: Pending conf = ∅
2: upon event Deliver confirmation req from Client c(< Conf req, Accepted set >)
3: Pending conf = Pending conf ∪ {< Conf req, Accepted set, c >}
4: upon event ∃ < Conf req, Accepted set, c >∈ Pending conf : < ·, Accepted set, ·, ·, timestamp, r > appears b(n+
f)/2c+ 1 times in Ack history
5: Send to Client c(< Conf rep, Accepted set, pi >)
6: Pending conf = Pending conf \ {< Conf req, Accepted set, c >}
Proof. The proof consists in showing that (1) liveness, (2) read validity, (3) read consistency, (4) update
stability, (5) read monotonicity, and (6) update visibility properties holds. We prove each property
separately.
• (1) Liveness of the update operation is straightforward from Theorem 5. For the read operation,
liveness holds from update liveness and from the fact that among the (f + 1) received values, at
least one is the decision value of a correct replica, which by Lines 37- 39 of Algorithm 3, has been
accepted and reliably broadcast to all proposers by (2f + 1) acceptors, and thus reliably delivered
by all proposers (by Liveness of Reliable Broadcast);
• (2) Straightforward from the fact that the value returned by a read is a decision value.
• (3) Straightforward from Theorem 4;
• (4) By Observation 4 and by the fact that a read operation begins with an update operation;
• (5) By applying the same argument as for update stability, read monotonicity holds.
• (6) By applying the same argument as for update stability, update visibility holds.
Lemma 12. The above transformation is resilient to Byzantine clients.
Proof. A Byzantine client c may threaten the correctness of the above transformation by uncorrectly
executing the read and write operations.
• Suppose that c invokes Update(cmd). If cmd is not a admissible command (i.e., is not an element
of the lattice) then correct replicas filter out cmd (line 17), and thus the operation has no impact
on the RSM state. Now, if c sends cmd to less than f + 1 replicas (line 3), then it is sufficient that
a single replica receives and proposes cmd to GWTS for cmd to be decided by all correct replicas,
and thus correctly impacts the state of the RSM. Finally if c invokes a sequence of updates ui, . . . u`
without waiting for each ui to complete (line 4), then these update operations will be considered
as concurrent operations, which is handled by GWTS.
• Suppose that c invokes Read(). The only difference with the Update() operation is the confirmation
phase (lines 7- 11) which acts as a proof that the value returned by the read operation is a decided
value. This phase does not impact the state of the RSM, which completes the proof of the lemma.
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8 Safety by Signature Algorithm - An algorithm with linear
message complexity
In this Section we will discuss how to decrease the message complexity using signatures. The resulting
algorithm has a message complexity of O(n) when f = O(1). This Algorithm introduces a trade-off
between message-complexity and message-size: it sends messages that could have size O(n2), this is not
the case with the original WTS. Pseudocode is on Algorithms 8,9, and 10. The algorithm is conceptually
divided in three phases:
• Init: in this phase each process broadcasts a signed version of its initial proposed value. A process
collects these messages until it sees (n− f) of it. The purpose of this phase is to ensure that any
correct process is able to create a set of values containing at least |X ∪B| − 2f values from correct
processes.
• Safetying: At the end of the init phase a correct process has a certain set of values. The purpose of
the safetying phase is to make at least |X ∪B| − 2f such values safe. In such case a value v is safe
if we are sure that no other process can see a different value v′ that is also safe and has been sent
by the same sender of v. Safetying is done by performing a broadcast of the (n− f) signed values
obtained in the init phase towards the acceptors. Each acceptor keeps a set of values that are
candidate to be safe. Once an acceptor receives a set of values from a proposer, it starts processing
each value contained in it. If there is a value v such that it has not see another value sent by
the same sender (this check is done by using signature), it adds the value v to its candidate set.
Otherwise, if it exists a v′ from the same sender, it adds (v, v′) to a temporary set of Conflicts. The
acceptor replies back to the proposer by sending a signed message that contains the set received,
and the set of conflicts found. A proposer possesses a proof of safety for a value v if it receives
b(n + f)/2c + 1 messages from different acceptors in which v never appears as a conflict. The
intuition behind this phase is that if the same Byzantine process injects two (or more) values
signed by him in the init phase, then at most one of them could manage to get a correct proof of
safety.
• Proposing: This phase is identical to the proposing phase of WTS. The only difference is that
a correct proposer and acceptor refuse to process any message that contains a value without an
attached proof of safety.
8.1 Algorithm properties
We say that a value v and a value v′ conflict if v 6= v′ and v.sender = v′.sender. Given a set of values
we say that the set is conflicting if it contains two conflicting values.
Safety. In the signature based algorithm we define a value as safe if:
Definition 7. (Safe value) A value v is safe if there are b(n + f)/2c + 1 broadcasts of messages <
safe ack,Rcvd set, Conflicts, rts > from different acceptors, such that v is contained in each Rcvd set
and it is not contained in a pair inside a set Conflicts.
Lemma 13. Let Wj be the set of values signed by process pj ∈ P appearing during any execution of the
SbS algorithm. Wj contains at most one safe value.
Proof. By contradiction let us assume that there are two values x, y ∈Wj both safe. Then for each value
we have b(n+f)/2c+1 acceptors that broadcast the safe ack messages. Any two sets of b(n+f)/2c+1
acceptors have a non empty intersection in the set of correct acceptors: there should be at least one
correct acceptor p that generated the message (or messages) safe ack that made both x and y safe.
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Algorithm 8 SbS One - Algorithm for proposer process pi
1: Proposed set = Safe acks = Ack set = ∅
2: byz[∀k ∈ [0, n]] = False . Each location i stores a boolean indicating if acceptori is known to be Byzantine.
3: ts = 0
4: Safety set = ∅
5: proposed value = ⊥
6: state = init
7: . Init Phase
8: upon event proposed value 6= ⊥
9: payload =<Sign(proposed value), pi > . signed value
10: Safety set = Safety set ∪ {payload}
11: BrodcastToProposers(< init phase, payload >)
12: upon event BcastDelivery from sender(< init phase,< value, sender >>)
13: if Verify(value) ∧ value is a point of the lattice ∧state = init then
14: Safety set = RemoveConflicts(Safety set ∪ {< value, sender >})
15: . Safetying phase
16: upon event upon event |Safety set| ≥ n− f ∧ state = init
17: state = safetying
18: BrodcastToAcceptors(< safe req, Safety set >)
19: upon event Delivery when state = safetying from sender(m =< safe ack,Rcvd set, Conflicts >)
20: if Verify(m) ∧Rcvd set = Safety set ∧ ∀(x, y) ∈ Conflicts| VerifyConfPair((x, y)) then
21: Safe acks = Safe acks ∪ {(< safe ack,Rcvd set, Conflicts >, sender)}
22: else
23: byz[sender] = True
24: . Proposing Phase
25: upon event |Safe acks| ≥ b(n+ f)/2c+ 1 ∧ state = safetying
26: for all < v, s >∈ Safety set such that (@(< ·, ·, Conflicts, · >, ·) ∈ Safe acks|(< v, s >, ·) ∈ Conflicts ∨ (·, <
v, s >) ∈ Conflicts) do
27: Proposed set = Proposed set ∪ {< v, Safe acks >}
28: state = proposing
29: Ack set = ∅
30: ts = ts+ 1
31: BrodcastToAcceptors(< ack req, Proposed set, ts >)
32: upon event Delivery when state = proposing from sender(< ack,Rcvd set, rts >)
33: if rts = ts then
34: if Proposed set = Rcvd set ∧ byz[sender] = False then
35: Ack set = Ack set ∪ {(< ack, Proposed set, rts >, sender)}
36: else
37: byz[sender] = True
38: upon event Delivery when state = proposing from sender(< nack,Rcvd set, rts >)
39: if rts = ts then
40: if Proposed set 6= Rcvd set ∪ Proposed set ∧ byz[sender] = False∧AllSafe(Rcvd set) then
41: Proposed set = Rcvd set ∪ Proposed set
42: Ack set = ∅
43: ts = ts+ 1
44: BrodcastToAcceptors(< ack req, Proposed set, ts >)
45: else
46: byz[sender]=True
47: upon event |Ack set| ≥ b(n+ f)/2c+ 1 ∧ state = proposing
48: state = decided
49: Only values = {v : ∃ < v, · >∈ Proposed set}
50: DECIDE(Only values)
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Algorithm 9 SbS One - Algorithm for acceptor process pi
1: SafeCandidates = ∅
2: Accepted set = ∅
3: upon event BcastDelivery from sender(< safe req, Safety set >)
4: if ∀ < v, s >∈ Safety set|Verify(v) then
5: Send to sender(Sign(< ack, Safety set, ReturnConflicts(Safety set ∪ SafeCandidates), x >))
6: SafeCandidates = SafeCandidates∪RemoveConflicts(Safety set ∪ SafeCandidates)
7: upon event BcastDelivery from sender(< ack req,Rcvd set, x >)
8: if AllSafe(Rcvd set) then
9: if Accepted set ≤ Rcvd set then
10: Accepted set = Rcvd set
11: Send to sender(< ack,Accepted set, x >)
12: else
13: Send to sender(< nack,Accepted set, x >)
14: Accepted set = Rcvd set ∪Accepted set
Algorithm 10 Helper Procedures
1: procedure ReturnConflicts(Set)
2: Result = ∅
3: for all (x, y) ∈ Set× Set| s.t. VerifyConfPair((x, y)) do
4: Result = Result ∪ {(x, y)}
5: return Result
6: procedure RemoveConflicts(Set)
7: Result = Set
8: for all (x, y) ∈ReturnConflicts(Set) do
9: Result = Result \ {x, y}
10: return Result
11: procedure VerifyConfPair((x, y))
12: return Verify(x) ∧ Verify(y) ∧ x.sender = y.sender ∧x.value 6= y.value
13: procedure AllSafe(Set)
14: Result = True
15: for all < v,Acks >∈ Set do
16: if |Acks| ≥ b(n+f)/2c+1∧(@ < ·, P roposal, ·, · >∈ Acks|v 6∈ Proposal)∧(@ < ·, ·, Conflicts, · >∈ Acks|(v, ·) ∈
Conflicts ∨ (·, v) ∈ Conflicts) ∧ (@m ∈ Acks|¬Verify(m) is not valid ) ∧ (@m,m′ ∈ Acks|m 6= m′ ∧ m.sender=
m′.sender) ∧ v is a point of the lattice then
17: Result = Result ∧ True
18: else
19: Result = Result ∧ False
20: return Result
21: procedure Sign(e)
22: Signs the element e (that could be a message or a value) and it returns a new element e′ that is a signed version of
e.
23: procedure Verify(e)
24: Takes an element e, and it returns true if an only if e has a correct signature: e has been returned by a call to the
above Sign procedure.
18
First of all, notice that the message cannot be the same for both values (since they conflict they would
be inserted in Conflicts by p, see line 5 of the acceptor code). For this reason we should have that p
has done two different broadcasts one for x and one for y. Let us assume w.l.o.g that the first broadcast
has been for x, note that x is inserted in SafeCandidate set (line 6). This implies that once a safe req
with set containing y is received by p (line 3) p detects the conflict with x in SafeCandidate (line 5).
Therefore, p cannot generate any message in which y does not appear in Conflicts.
Lemma 14. Let us consider an execution of SbS. Let pi be a correct process, and let vi be a value that
pi signs and inserts in its Proposed set at line 10. If pi decides a set decidei, then vi ∈ decidei.
Proof. First of all, note that pi is the only one that can create a valid signature on a value v. Therefore,
if a Byzantine process creates a pair in a Conflicts set containing value vi for a certain message m =<
safe ack, ·, Conflicts, · > , then no correct process will insert m in its Safe ack set (the signature check
at line 20 will not be passed). Stated otherwise, vi can never appear in a Conflicts set of a message
m =< safe ack, ·, Conflicts, · > that will be processed by any correct process. This implies that, if
pi decides, then pi inserted vi in Safe proposal at line 27. Since, pi never removes any value from
Proposed set we have that an eventual decision contains vi.
Note that the proposing phase of SbS is analogous to the one of the WTS algorithm. It is not hard
to see that Lemma 1 and Observation 2 holds also for the proposing phase of SbS.
Theorem 7. Let us consider a set of processes, of size at least (3f + 1), executing SbS algorithm.
Algorithm SbS enforces: (1) Comparability; (2) Inclusivity; (3) Non-Triviality; (4) Stability.
Proof. We prove each property separately.
1. is implied by Lemma 1, Observation 2 and the fact that a proposer refuses to process nacks
containing values that are not safe (see if at line 40).
2. by Lemma 14.
3. the bound on B and X derives from the safety of each value inserted in a decision and Lemma 13.
4. is ensured by line 48 in the code run by proposers.
Liveness The main result of this section is a bound of O(f) on the number of times a proposer refines
its proposal. This bound will be needed to prove that our algorithm uses a quadratic number of messages.
Lemma 15. Let us consider an execution of SbS. Any correct process eventually executes line 31, and
when it does its Proposed set contains at least |X ∪B| − 2f values.
Proof. Since at most f processes are faulty line 16 will be eventually executed on each proposer, and
when it happens its Safety set contains at least |X ∪ B| − f values. It remains to show that line 31
is eventually executed and that at most f values are not inserted in Proposed set during the loop at
line 27. First of all notice that at least (n− f) acceptors will reply to the safe req sent at line 18, this
ensures that eventually the procedure at line 25 will be executed. Moreover, we have that the Safety set
sent at line 18 contains at most f values of Byzantine processes. By the same reasoning used in the
proof of Lemma 14 we have that at least |X ∪B| − 2f values are from correct proposers and will be sent
at line 31.
Lemma 16. A correct proposer refines its proposal (executing line 44) at most 2f times.
Proof. Each time a correct proposer executes line 44, it passes the if at line 40, thus increasing its
Proposed set. However, its first proposal, in line 18, contains at least |X ∪ B| − 2f values. Since there
are at most |X ∪B| safe values (from Lemma 13) and the if at line 40 can be passed only when all values
inside Rcvd set are safe, the claim follows.
Lemma 17. When a correct acceptor receives a message m =< ack req,Rcvd set, x > from a correct
proposer it answers with an ack or a nack.
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Proof. If a correct acceptor sends a message m then each value in Rcvd set is safe, thus, when m is
delivered by a correct acceptor, the if at line 8 will be passed and the acceptor will answer with an ack
or a nack.
Mutatis mutandis, an analogous of Lemma 4 holds also for the proposing phase of SbS:
Lemma 18. If there is a time t after which a correct proposer pi in state proposing cannot execute
line 44, then pi eventually decides.
Proof. Let < ack req, Proposed set, ts > be the last ack request message sent by pi. Since pi does not
execute line 41 it means that either it does not receive any nack, or that any nack it receives does not
allow him to pass the if line 40. Since pi is correct its message < ack req, Proposed set, ts > will reach
each correct acceptor. By hypothesis each of them will send a ack, otherwise pi should be able to execute
line 41 (they all handle the ack request by Lemma 17). Once pi receives the acks from the set of correct
acceptors it will handle them, Lemma 17, and decides.
Theorem 8. Let us consider a set of processes, of size at least (3f + 1), executing SbS algorithm. Every
correct proposer decides in at most 5 + 4f message delays.
Proof. The broadcast at line 11 takes at most 1 message delay. Therefore after one message delay
each correct process starts its safetying phase. This phase takes two message delays: one to reach the
acceptors, and one to receive the response back. Each refinement takes at most 2 message delays, the time
needed to broadcast and receive a response. There are at most 2f refinements, see Lemma 16. Executed
in at most 4f message delays, by Lemma 18 after 5 + 4f message delay a correct has to decide.
Message Complexity We now bound the message complexity by counting the maximum number of
messages needed by a correct proposer to decide. We do it phase by phase:
• Init phase: each correct proposer executes a single broadcast. Cost O(n).
• Safetying phase: each correct proposer executes a single broadcast, such broadcast triggers at most
one point-to-point response from each correct acceptor. Cost O(n).
• Proposing phase: each correct proposer executes a single broadcast for each proposal refinement
and one broadcast for its initial proposal. Each of these broadcasts triggers at most one point-to-
point response from each correct acceptors. Cost O(f · n).
Summing the above costs we have a bound of O(n) messages.
8.2 Generalising SbS
Adapting the SbS algorithm to its generalised version, while keeping the message complexity improve-
ment, needs a special attention to substitute the reliable broadcast used to acknowledge in the GWT
(line 10 of Algorithm 4). We would like to replace such broadcast with a single point-to-point message.
Conceptually, that reliable broadcast has two functions: (1) it implicitly disseminates to all proposers
the fact that someone is able to decide in a certain round (sharing also a possible decision value), (2) it
forces a Byzantine process to broadcast the same ack message to all proposers, enforcing the “publicity”
of such action.
These two functions can be replaced by two modifications. The second function could be replaced
by forcing an acceptor to sign its, now poin-to-point, ack. Intuitively this allows a proposer to prove
others that it received a certain ack for its proposal request. The first function is replaced by letting
any correct proposer broadcast a special decided message before deciding, such message has attached
all the acks used to decide. This would allow proposers and acceptors that receive a decided message
to know that the sender of such message was allowed to decide by the algorithm rules (recall that acks
are now signed). Similarly to what happen in GWTS, a round r ends when someone broadcasts a well-
formed decided message for that round. Where with well-formed we mean that such decided message
has attached b(n + f)/2c + 1 signed acks. Therefore, a correct acceptor will trust a round r, only if it
trusted round (r− 1) and it knows that rounds (r− 1) terminated (this knowledge derives from seeing a
decided message for round (r−1) ). Finally, to avoid the reliable broadcast of decided messages, a correct
acceptor piggybacks a decided message, that it has seen for a round r, in the replies to ack requests for
round r.
20
Message Complexity The message complexity follows the same lines of the analysis in Section 6.4.
However, since we are not using the Byzantine reliable broadcast, messages per decision on each proposer
are at most O(f · n).
9 Conclusions
We investigated Byzantine Lattice Agreement and we used it to build a byzantine tolerant RSM with
commutative updated. There are several directions meriting investigation. Our main interest is to
understand whether a message delay of O(f) is necessary or not. In the crash-stop model a recent
paper [15] has shown that O(log f) delays are sufficient. Therefore, a first step would be to investigate
if the technique used in [15] could be “Byzantined” while preserving the desirable delay. A final target
is to understand the necessary number of message delays. This would be extremely interesting, even in
the crash-stop model such knowledge is still missing.
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